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Draft Recontmendation
on organisittg security irt Eurupe 
- 
political aspects
The Assembly.
(i) Considering that the pulpose of the modified Brussels Treaty is to ensure the defence of ntentber
countries, promote Europcan unity and stren-ethen both collective security in Europe and world peace:
(ii) Noting that WEU tnember countries are resolved to continue to exercise their sovereignty over all
matters rclating to the composition of theirarmed tbrces and their possible deployntent:
(iii) Enrphasising that NATO provides Europc rvith its essential means of defence;
(it') Recalling that the European Union is not in a position at present to establish either a common
defence policy or, much less. a comrnon defence. both of which are to be irnplemented principally through
NATOr
(t') Considering, nevertheless. that the European Union can develop a common foreign and security
policl' only by hal'ing available military structures that are closely associated with it and that European
security can be assured only if underpinned by adequate defence or deterrent means:
(vi) Taking the view that such means can onl1' be obtained through close cooperation'between states
with defence policies that converge towards the same objectivesl
(t'ii) Considering therefbre that WEU should express its own views on hou' the objectives of the inter-
governmental conf-erence with regard to foreign and security policy matters should be attained and regret-
ting that the Council has been unable to do so sufficiently clearly in the document it adopted in Madrid. on
l-1 November 1995:
(r'ill) Wishing consequently to make a contribution to that conference which would help it produce
constructive results pt'omoting security. democracv. European Union progress and world peace:
1ix) Noting that the objective being pursued by the majority of WEU member countries is completion of
the European edifice through progressive integration of the security and defence dintension in the Euro-
pean Union. but that this will be achieved only if the fbllowins conditions are met. which for the time
being is not the case;
(o) the existence of a common perception of the role the European Union wishes to play in the
world and the contribution it wants to make to security in Europe and neighbouring regions:
(D) identification of national security and defence interests and development of the coordination
necessary to bring about policy convergcnce,
(c) development of a global European detence concept and of a cornmon policy that takes account
of cach country's specific views, the possible role of nuclear deterrence and the fact that no
ntetnber country seems prepared to relinquish the essential attributes of its sovereignty in this
area. which implies that all decisions rnust be the product of a consensusl
(d) resolution of the problems raised by the refusal of some European Union mernber countries to
partrcipate in a collective def-ence within the European and Atlantic tiamervorksl
(e) settlement of the problertt created by the fact that three European member countries of the
Atlantic Alliance. while contributing fully to Europe's defence, are not rnembers ol'the Euro-
pean Union;
(.f) the existence of an agreement on the role the nine WEU associate partner countries which
intend to join the European Union in due course might and would wish to play in developing
and implententing a common foreign, security and def'ence policy:
(g,) implementation of the January 1994 agreement between WEU and NATO on the use of each
other's assets in collective defence and crisis- manasement and peacekeeping tasks;
(/l,) a common perception of the consequences for transatlantic relations of thc transformation of
the European Union into a rnilitary power, the eff-ects of the enlargenenr of the Union and the
development of its relations with nei-ehbouring countries, particularly rnernbers of the CIS and
Mcdilerranean countrics:
a
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(.r) Convinced that. under these circumstances, any plan to terminate the modified Brussels Treaty and
transfer WEU's responsibilities for collective def'ence and crisis managernent to the common foreign and
security policy of the European Union would be dangerous and would uot increase European security and
hence should be discarded by the conf'erence,
(,ri) Considering that it is necessary to work towards a rapprochement between WEU and the European
Union through a gradual process which might if desired eventually Iead to the development of a European
security and del-ence identity in a single European framework, once all the necessary conditions have been
met:
(rii) Taking the view, therefore. that for the time being the European Union should concentrate the main
part of its work on improving the CFSP decision-making process, without necessarily creating new struc-
iures, while WEU should endeavour to become fully operational in order to rcspond to CFSP requests and
to be ablc to undertake actions consequent to its own decisions,
(.rili) Welcoming the fact that France's decision to participate more closely in military cooperation in
NATO and its Nuclear Planning Group facilitates the development of a courmon European defence in the
Atlantrc Alliance, the European Union and WEU,
RpcorvnreNos rHAT rHE Couxcll
1. Take the view that WEU's contribution to the intergovernntental cont'erence should not be confined
to submission of the document on the subject adopted in Madrid on 1-l November 1995, but that it should
actively monitor the intergol'ernmental conference and hold regular consultations to evaluate the progress
of the conference in WEU's areas of responsibility with a view to intervening if nccessaryl
2. Regularly inform the associate member and associate partner countries and the Assembly of pro-
gress made at the intergovernmental conference so as to give them the possibility of making their views
known in good time;
3. Maintain the moditied Brussels Treaty in force, contemplate no revision thereof other than by the
si-enatory states and not allow accession to WEU by any country not prepared to participate fully and
without reservation in a common defence within the fiamework of the Atlantic Alliance and at the same
tirne in thc- activities of the CFSPI
-1. Reconsider the Assembly's repeated requests to permit European members of the Atlantic Alliance
u,ho rvish to join WEU as full rnembers to do so without having to be full members of the European Unionl
5. Encourage all efforts to improve the working of the CFSP but not transfer to it the exercise of any
of the authority conferred on WEU by the modified Brussels Treaty, and strengthen cooperation between
WEU and the CFSP. in particular by ensuring re-eular participation by the WEU Secretariat-General in the
activities of the CFSPI
6. Reject any proposal to separate WEU from the European Union. and give proper effect to the deci-
sion taken at Maastricht to place WEU at the service of the Europeatt Union should military action be
envisa-eed under the CFSP, at the sanre time ensuring that the WEU Council makes full use of rts ability to
take any decisions arisin-e out of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, which will always be in
the interest of the European Union and other organisations such as the United Nations and the OSCE;
1. Oppose admissiou to the European Union of any country not prepared to participate in a.common
det-ence within the framcwork of the Atlantic Alliance and the modified Brussels Treaty but envisage, tbr
those Europcan countries that so wish. simultaneous rapprochement with the European Union, WEU and
NATO:
8. Make sure that any measures taken by the intergovernmental conference ensure that the develop-
rnent of the European Union and of WEU lead in due course, and consistently in an intergovernmental
framework. to full participation by WEU in a Union that will remain incomplete as long as it is unable to
develop a security policy and a cotntnon defence;
9. Resume preparation to this end of a white paper on European security and def'ence rdentitying all
areas whcre convergence exists between the relevant policies of ntetnber states, noting any differences and
preparing a review by all countries concerned of the progress that needs to be made to enable the Euro-
pean Union to act etfectively around the globe;
10. Give WEU the essential means of cornmand for rnilitary action in which NATO is not involved. at
the same time developing interoperability of WEU and NATO assets and pressing NATO to proceed rapid-
ly with the implementation of the January l99l agreelnent on the CJTFI
3
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I I . Provide fbr permanent consultation between the competent bodies of the European Union and WEU
with a l'iew to cxtendin-u European cooperatiou to areas resen'ed under Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome,
specifically armaments and space:
12. Use all the nteans available to it to prorrote better infbnnation and understanding about Western
European Union in governrnent. parliarnent and the general public in thc United States and Canada;
13. Treat the Assernbly as its interlocutor on all matters pertaining to the application of the rriodified
Brussels. Treaty and durin-t the intergovernmental conference insist that. fbr as long as meurber states
remain the sole executors of their sovereignty in this area. national parliantents and delegations lepresen-
ting thent in the WEU Assembly are thc only partners of 
-eovenrrnents and the Council with authbrity in
security and defence matters.
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Draft Order
on orgunisittg security in Europe 
- 
political aspects
The Assembly'.
Desirous that its position on the organisation of security' in Er-rrope. which it adopted at the extra-
oldinary session held in London on 22 and 23 February 1996. is duly taken into account at the 1996
intergor ernmental conl'erencc,
INvrlEs ITs PRESU)ENT
To transmit the reports on the organisalion of security in Europe, adopted at the London extraordi-
nary session. to:
(a) the Chairman-in-Office of the CoLrncil of the European Union.
(b) the group of representatives of the European Union fbreign atfairs ministers, which is respon-
sible fbr preparing the intergovernmental confereltce.
(c,) the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union.
(d) the President of the European Commission.
(e) the President of the Europcan Parliament.
(.f) the national parliaments of the rrernber countries of the European Union.
(g) the national parliautents and fbreign ministries of WEU associate tnetnber and associate pat't-
ner coluttries.
(h) thc Secretary'-General of NATO.
(i) the President of the North Atlantic Assembly.
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Exp lanatory M emorandwn
(submitted by Mr de Puig, Chairman and Rapporteur)
L lntroductiort
l. On the eve of thc intergovernmental confe-
rence on the rer,'ision of the Treaty on European
Union. which is to open rn Turin under the Italian
presidency on 29 March 1996. the Assernbly of
WEU finds itself in a state of uncertaint),. not to
mention deadlock, as regards the stance WEU
should take. The document entitled " WEU
contribution to the European Union intergovern-
mental conference of 1996 ". adopted by the
WEU Council of Ministers in Madrid' on l.l
November 1995 and transmitted to the European
Union, discusses three options regarding future
relations between WEU and the European Union,
without favouring any particular one since the
Council of Ministers was not ablc to reach a
consensus on the matter.
2. Moreover. the parallel debate on WEU in
the Reflection Group set up by the European
Union. under the chairmanship of Mr Carlos
Westendorp. merely adds to the uncertainty. Its
final report. published on 5 December 1995, sets
out a numbcr of options. which do not appear to
be the same as those drawn up by the WEU Coun-
cil. Lastly, the latter clearly informed the Assem-
bly that it considered the debate closed and did
not envisage re-opening a discussion among
member governments in an attempt to reach a
common position.
3. Although the Spanish presidency of the
Council had stated that any contribution from the
Assembly would be welcorned and would cerlainly
be taken into consideration in discussions
concerning the conference. experience has none-
theless shown that the Council has so far failed to
take account of the Assembly's contributions to
the institutional debate, notwithstanding its state-
ment in the second part of its fortieth annual
report that the Assernbly's contribution to this
debate was both welcorne and most necessary'.
-1. Given that the Council document on the
" WEU contributron to the European Uuion inter-
-qovernmental conf'erence of 1996 ". or indeed the
report of the European Union Reflection Group
do not contain even a remote reference to any
aspects the Assernbly has considered in depth,
particularly as re-eards the organisation of parlia-
mentary supervision at European level of the
Docurrrent 1192. 20 Nor,eurber I 995
Docur.nent l-+-s3. 
-10 N{arch I995
security and defence dimension. one might ques-
tion the value that should be attached to state-
rnents from the WEU Council. particularly in
view of the emphasis it places in the Lisbon
Declaration on " the irnportance they [the minis-
tersl attach to the role played by the Assembly in
the debate on security and def-ence in Europe and
its substantive contribution to the wider conside-
rations of these issues " ' or the statement in the
Madrid Declaration dated l-l November 1995*
that " ministers appreciated the valuable contribu-
tion of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU to
the ongoing development of Western European
Union. Ministers attach great importance to the
Assemblv's input into the debate on security and
defence in Europe ".
5. In point of fact the only references to the
Assernbly contained in the above document on
WEU's contribution to the intergovernmental
conference are to be fbund in paragraph l8 where
it is claimed that " closer cooperation between the
parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the Euro-
pean Parliament has not been promoted ". which
is far from being the case as it is well known that
the Assembly'has spared no effort in atternpting to
establish cooperative relations with the European
Parliament on the basis of equality and recipro-
cit),. I1 the European Parliamenr considers that it
cannot establish its relations u,ith the WEU
Assembly on this basis. this decision cannot be
attributed to a failure to promote such cooperation
on the part of the Assembly. The Assernbly is
mentioned a second time in para-eraph 87 of the
same document dealing with the irnplications of
integration of WEU in the European Union in the
franrer,l'ork of option C. where the Council merely
states: " The parlialnentary Assembly's functions
would be assurned by the European Parliament in
accordance with the provisions gor,'erning thc
CFSP ".
6. However paragraph 85 clearly states that in
the event of WEU's integration in the European
Union. Article J.4.3 of the Maastricht Treaty,
would be maintained in its present form. The
paragraph makes clear that questions with defence
implications would nttt be subject to the proce-
dures defined in Articlc J.3. which provrdes tbr
the possibilitv of decisions being taken by a quali-
fied majoritl,. Consequently. the Council consi-
3 Paragraphs 6 lnd 8 ol'the Reply of the Council to Recon.r
uendatron 57-5. Docunrcnt 1.197. I Dr-cemher l9t)-5.
-1. Docunrent I -19 I . l0 Nor entber I t)t)5.
DOCLTMENT I509
ders that the principle of consensus among
governments should be tttaintained in defence
rnatters even after the integration of WEU in the
European Union. Your Rapporteur therefore
wishes to point to the incompatibility between the
option envisaged by the Council of transferring
the WEU Assembly's responsibilities to the Euro-
pean Parlrament, a community institution. and
that of fully preserving member countries' nutio-
nal sovereignty over detence matters thus placing
thc defence dimension within a purely intergo-
vernmental framework.
7 . Consequently, the Assembly increasingly
has the impression that political will is lacking not
only in European Union circles but also in the
relevant authorities of the WEU Council, even
when it is merely a matter of the Council listening
to arguments put forward by the Assembly. The
present report therefore has a threefbld objective:
first. to convince the Council that although it has
transmitted the docurnent it adopted in Madrid to
the European Union. it still cannot consider its
preparatory work for the intergovernmental
conference to have ended. On the cclntrary, if
WEU is regarded as an integral part of the process
of European Union development and rf further-
more it is held that Arlicle VIII.l of the modified
Brussels Treaty places an obligation on the
WEU Council to encourage " the progressive
integration of Europe " and closer cooperation
between member countries and other European
organisations, the Council should participate
actively in the intergovernmental conference
and continue to contribute as the negotiations
progress. Furthermore it must keep the Assembly
infbrmed of any developments during the course
of the negotiations likely to affect the future
activitres and role of our organisation.
8. Secondly, this report is intended lbr all the
governments participating in the intergovernmen-
fal conference and particularly the representatives
of each of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and of the
President of the European Colnmission. who
make up the group to which. at its meeting in
Madrid on 15 and 16 Decernber 199-5, the Euro-
pean Council gave the responsihility of preparing
the conference. It would be highly desirable. in
matters relating to the future organisation of Euro-
pean security and defence. for the competent
authorities in this area. such as WEU and the
del-ence ministries, to be involved in some fort.u or
another in the preparation of the conf'erence and
the negotiations thentselves. It goes without
saying that this report is also intended for the
governments of the WEU associate metnber and
associate partner countries, which are not invol-
ved in the conference but which have a major
interest in the outcome.
9. Thirdly. this report is intendcd to draw the
attention of the national parliaments of European
Union member countries to the issues at stake at
the intergovernmental conference. The way in
which governments have so far made it impos-
sible for the national parliaments that will be
required to ratify the new treaty to decide how
they intend to organise parliamentary supervision
of security and defence at European level is
wholly unacceptable. It is quite inconceivable that
a diplomatic conference alone should decide upon
the organisation of parliamentary supervision in a
reformed European Union. The Speaker of the
French National Assembly is therefore to be
congratulated on having formed a parliamentary
reflection group on the 1996 intergovernmental
conference, bringing together. over a period of
five months in 1995, parliamentarians appointed
by the speakers of their l'espective assentblies.
The group did very useful work, the conclusions
of which were published and conveyed to the
intergovernmental Ref'lection Group on't Decem-
ber 1995'.
II. Defining the purpose of the institutional
reforms of the European Union
in areas of interest to WE(l
10. Paragraph 22 of the Madrid Declaration
adopted on l;[ November 199-5 by the Council of
Ministers of WEU " states that " Ministers reitera-
ted their conviction that the construction of an
integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long
as it does not include security and defence and
reaffirmed that the objective is to build up WEU
in sta-ees as the defencc component of the Euro-
pean Union ". The first part of this oft-repeated
statement implies that a consensus cxists on the
purpose of such construction. which is not the
case. Persistent difTerences of opinion on this
nrattel'find expression in the tirst part of the linal
report by the Reflection Group responsible for
preparing the 1996 intergovernmental conf-erence
entitled " A strategy for Europe ", in which the
Group observes that " Thc (European) Union is
not and does not want to be a super-state. Yet it is
far more than a market. It is a unique design based
on common values".
11. The basic question raised by Mrs Aguiar in
her report " the future o1' European security and
the preparation of Maastricht II "". was to ask
what the objective of European integration was in
the fiamework of the European Union. This has
still not been answered. However there is no disa-
5. Assemb16r- Natronale: intitrmatton paper\ on the parlia-
lnentar]' rcflectron group on the 1996 tntergoverntnental
conf'erencc. Report of proceedtngs aud couclusions, June-
Dr-cember 1995.(r Document 1.191.20 Noventber lt)95.
7. Docurrcnt l-1-5t1. 16 N'Ia1 1995, Erplanatory Mcmoran-
dum. palagraph 19.
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greement on the soals to be achieved in certain
quite specific areas. There is scneral asl'eentcnt in
thinkin-s that an1, institutional refonn should gua-
l'antee and incrcase the security of citizens and
peace and stabilitv in Europe and the world. not
lessen thern. In order to def-end in ELrrope these
values and the fuudameutal principles set out in
the preantble to the modified Brussels Treaty.
namely, thc principles of dentocracy. civil and pcr-
sonal libertics and fundantental human rights pro-
clairned in the Unite.d Nations Charter. the states
partv to thc Treaty gave a firnt cornntitnteut to
defend Europe against all external a_{-gression.
12. The commitutent of the WEU nreniber
countries found expression first in the prearnble
to the rnodified Brussels Treaty in which the
si-enatory statcs undertake " To aflbrd assi\tancc
to each other, in accordance u'ith the Charter of
thc United Nations. in rnaintaining international
peace and security and in resistin-r any, policy
of a-geression " and. even more stronely. in
nrticG V. which establishes an uncondltional
obligation that. in the event ol'armed asqlession
against the European territory of any si-gnatorv
state. the others al'e to provide ntilitarv assis-
tancc.
13. Until now this binding cornmitrnent off-ers
an absolute guarantee against ntrlitarv a-ggression
onlv to tull rnenibers of WEU that have acceded
to the modified Brussels Treatv and are at the
same tirne nrembers of the Atlantic Allianee.
Under Article IV of the rnodifled Brussels Treat),.
Europe's territorial def'encc has been assisned ttt
NATO rrilitary authorities and tbrces.
l-1. Had there been a dcsire to find a simple
way of cxtending the territol'ial def-cnce 
_quarantee
to all mentbers of the European Union. it rvould
have sufTiced to make accession ttt the ntodified
Brussels Treatt, and the Washington Trcaty ir
condition of entry to thc European Union and to
acknowledge unreservedll,' WEU acquis u,hile
decidin-g not to denounce the ntodified Brussels
Treaty' in 1998, the datc fi-xed arbitrarily in rhe
Maastricht Treatv by the 
_governrnents concerned.
rvith a view to that "deadline". If such had been
the case, it would have been possible to make the
modified Brussels Treaty, an inte-qral part of the
Treatv on European Union and the inter_eove-r'n-
mental conference would har e becn able to
concentrate its effbrts on probleuts other than that
of Europe's def-ence.
l-5. It u'as hor,,'ever decrded to procecd other-
u'ise and to leave European Union rnembers rvhich
are not members of WEU the choice of accedine
to WEU or becoming obsen,ers if they so wish.
Five European Union menrber countries. lbur ot'
them neutral, Ireland. Su'eden. Finland and Aus-
tria. and one. Denmark. a rnernber ol'the Atlantic
Alliance, opted to beconte observers. There u'ere
uncloubtcdly good reasons fbr actine thus and pre-
venting the European Union. including a fully
inte-erated WEU. fl'onr becoming a ELrropean mili-
tary bloc. The reason fbr not selectiu-u the l'irst
method was not 
.iust to take the interests of the
five countries ntentioned into account but also to
facrlitate convergence between European instrtu-
tions and the Central European countries it is
intended should one day becor.ne part of the
Union. Althou-eh enlargentent of the latter to
include the Central European countries is an
objective in principle recogniscd b1, the vast
rnajority of EU rnentber countries, not all of thent
are ),et prepared to sive these countries firm secu-
rity 
-cuarantees. Moreover. it should be rentetnbe-
rcd that as long as thc.r' remalll outside the Atlan-
tic Alliance. the Unite-d Statcs does not wish to be
obliged t() ol'l'et' thent u securill sulnlntce r ia an
intermediarv orsauisation. Finally rt is to no-one's
benetit to i-9nore the sccurity concerns of Rr-rssia.
which continues vigorttusly, to oppose any pros-
pcct of a ntilitary' alliance of which it is not a
rurer.nber bcing extcnded to its borders.
16. Morettver it u'as necessary to takc account
of the interests of European ntembers ol' the
Atlantic Alliance. such as Nonvay,. Turkey and
Iceland u,'hich. 1'or various reasons. are not at
present utenrbers of the European Union. In
accoldance u'ith the Declaration bv the
WEU mentber states, which is annexed io tne
Maastricht Treatv. these countries har e beconte
associate mernbers of WEU. u,hich sives thenr the
possibility of participating fully in the activities
of the organisation but u,ithout accedins to the
modified Brussels Treaty. Finally r.nention should
be made of other countries wishin-g to join thc
Europcan Union such as Cvprus and Malta,
'n''hose participation in the security and def-ence
dirnension of E,urope has yet to be clcfined.
11. Hence there is autple justification to ask
rvhether the intergovernmental confcrencc u'ill
really contribute to enhancing European securitybf insistrn-e on giving priority to tlte search f'or
arrangenrents tbr orsanising ELrrope's defence in
the fiameu'ork ol-the European Union in the pre-
sent conditions, nautely:
(rr) while both thc neutral countries and
Dcnntark maintain their refusal to par-
ticipatc in a cornnton defence as
conceived of within thc fl-antework of
WEU:
(lt) as long as the problern of widcning the
def'ence guarantee to the Central Euro-
pean countries 'ul'ithin their e.xistinc
borders renrains unlesolved:
(r') u'hile thc Ihree associate urcnrber
cotrntries are not nrcmbers of the Euro-
pean Union, and
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(d) while the form of participation in the
European security' and detence dimen-
sion of other countries wishing to join
the European Union. such as CYPrus
and Malta. has not been defined.
18. Such difficulties seent not to al'ise in rela-
tion to peacekeeping and crisis managetnent in
Europe and the wider w'orld. One of the Inain
objectives of the intergovernmental conference is
to develop methods enabling the European Union
to assert its identity more clearly on the interna-
tional scene and to acquire the capability to act
nrore effectively in crises that may afl'ect the secu-
rity of Europe and its citizens.
19. In this context it should be recalled that
within the framework of WEU the legal basis
already exists to empower the tnetnber countries
of that organisation to act in the event of interna-
tional crises. Article VIIL3 of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty' states that at the request of a member
country " the Council shall itrtmediately be
convened in order to enable them fthe High
Contracting Partiesl to consult with regard to any
situation which may constitute a threat to peace.
in whater,'c-r area this threat should arise ... ".
20. At present the signatory countries of the
Treaty alone have the right to make use of the pos-
sibility offered b1' the abovementioned Article.
However it has been agreed that all the coutttries
of the " WEU family ", natnely the associate
rnelnbers. associate partners and observers, will
be authorised to take part in Petelsberg-type mis-
sions. i.e. peace-keeping and peace-entbrcement
actions and humanitarian missions carried out
under the mandate of the United Nations or of the
OSCE.
21. Your Rapporteur wishes here to define
what he means by sccuriry' and de.t'cnce in order to
clear any ambiguity there might be over the use of
these terms in various contexts.
22. Dc.fertt't'means an1' preventive. deten'ent or
field action undertaken by'the countries involved
to secul'c their territorial integnty and protect their
vital interests. Article V of thc modified Brussels
Treaty provides WEU member countries with the
legal framervork for such action. complemellting
the cornrnitments they entercd into under Article 5
of the Washin-9ton Treatr'. Article IV of thc modi-
fied Brussels Treaty establishes a link between the
organisations responsible for the application of
the two Treaties and Article VIII prot'ides WEU
with an instrument lbr ensuring the smooth run-
ning of WEU both as au instrument of European
def'ence and for prontoting security in Europe and
in the u'ider rvorld.
23. By secttrtrr'. your Rapporteur understands
the organisation of peace in such a rvay as to
ar,'oid. contaitt or resolve conflicts u'hich might
endanger it. Securitf implies political action
which may be accotnpanied. although not neces-
sarily so, by economic or utilitary action. WELI
derives its responsibility in this area from Article
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty but this rcs-
ponsibility, can only be discharged in conjunction
with both the CFSP and NATO. given that secu-
rity operations must not under any circumstances
cornplomise the cohesion of the Union or the
defence of Europe. In the Petersberg Declaration
of l9 June 1992. the WEU Council specified how
it intended to act to e-nhance security in Europe
and the u'ider world.
21. This distinction is essential since on it are
based the relationships betu'een WEU and NATO
and between WEU and the European Union and
the neutral countries that are mentbers thereof. It
should not. however. obscure the fact that, in
practice. security and defence are closely linked
since action to preserve security cannot be eff'ec-
tive without a defence capability and defence
effectiveness must not be cotrpromised by actions
promoting security, particularly' bearing in mind
that the involvement of the United States ts essen-
tial for Europe's defence. This means that there
must be consultation with that country, even
on matters in which it wants no direct involve-
ment.
25. In view of the above considerations. it trtust
be emphasised that an)' reorganisation of the secu-
rity and defence dimension tn Europe must gua-
rantee that transatlantic ties are maitttained and
strengthened, particularly in the areas rcfcrred to.
both in terms of practical cooperation and task-
sharing between WEU and NATO and in the
context of the ne\\' transatlantic agenda utd thejoint action plan signed in Madrid ott 3 December
1995 by the Eulopean Union and the United
States. The importance of ensuring that there is
consistency of views on both sides of the Atlanttc
emerges, inter alia, tiom the wording used by the
authors o1 that document. which states:
" We share a commolt strategic vision of
Europe's future security. To-eether. rve havc
charted a course fbr ensuring continuing
peace in Europe into the next century. We
are committed to the cotrstruction of a new
E,uropean security a'chitecture in which the
North Atlantic Treatt' Organisation, the
European Union, Western European Union,
the Organisation for Securitl' and Coopera-
tion in Europe aud the Council of Europe
have compleurcntary and urutually reinlor-
cin-s roles to play.
We reaftlrm the indivisibility ol ttansatlan-
tic securitv. NATO remains, for its tnem-
bers, the centrepiece of transatlalttic secur-
ity. providing the indispcnsable link
between North America attd Europe. Fur-
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ther adaptatron of the Alliance's political
and military structures to ref-lect both the
full spectrum of its roles and the develop-
ment of the emerging European security
and defence identity will strengthen the
European pillar of the Alliance.
As to the accession of new members to
NATO and to the EU, these processes. auto-
nomous but complementary, should contri-
bute significantly to the extension of secu-
rity. stability and prosperity in the whole of
Europe. "
It is basically these last considerations that will
determine the level of any integration of the secu-
rity and def'ence dimension in a single European
framework.
26. Finally the way in which the European
Union decides to organise its own security and
defence will determine the nature of the ties of
cooperation and partnership it establishes with the
countries bordering on Europe that remain outside
the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic
Alliance, such as. fbr example. Russia. Belarus
and Ukraine and the countries on the other srde of
the Mediterranean. In particular the Council
confirmed the thrust of the European Union's
overall policy towards its future relations with
Russia as regards security at the Madrid summit
meeting on 15 and 16 December 1995 as follows:
" The EU should ensure transparency in
Western European securitl, decisions, espe-
cially those involving enlargement, in order
to take into account Russia's concerns. to
dispel existing misperceptions and to reas-
sure it that those decisions will not impair
its security but will lead to improved secu-
rity in Europe as a whole. This goal needs
to be pursued in a way which respects both
the full autonomy of Western European
security structures to decide on their insti-
tutional development and eventual enlarge-
ment, and the sovereign right of each
state to seek freely its own security arr-
angements as recognised by OSCE docu-
ments. "
21. According to the statement by the General
Affairs Council of the European Union on 20
November 1995. these goals could be achieved
through measures such as:
" 
- 
development, in the framework of exis-
ting mechanisms. of an open. stable
and substantial relationship of dialogue
and partnership between the Union and
Russia in the field of security, inclu-
dins relevant aspects of disarmament.
non-proliferation, arrns export controls
and conflict prevention and manage-
ment;
- 
exantination with Russia of the feasibi-
lity of joint initiatives on issues of
common interest in the field of security
and disarmament and on new chal-
lenges (such as prevention of illegal
traffic in fissile material, cooperation
on non-proliferation issues, etc.);
- 
focusing Russian attention on projects
related to security concerns eligible for
EU assistance programmes (defence
conversion, nuclear sat'ety, etc. );
- 
cooperating in the elaboration of a
common and comprehensive security
model tor the Europe of the 2lst cen-
tury. If and when useful, joint initia-
tives with Russia could be developed
in the OSCE framework:
- 
encouraging Russia to make full use of
its participation in NACC. PfP and.
where appropriate, to exploit its evol-
ving channels for dialogue with
NATO:
- 
encouraging Russia to take full advan-
tage of its developing contacts with
WEU:
- 
encouraging Russia and the Central
and Eastern European countries to
consolidate good-nei ghbourly relations
and to develop regional cooperation
arrangements in accordance with the
norms of international relations. The
EU should use the means at its disposal
to support and contribute directly to
such regional endeavours. notably in
the Baltic region and as regards the
follow-up to the Stability Pact in the
fiamework of the OSCE. "
According to the General Affairs Council it would
also be necessary to take measures such as:
" 
- 
suppofi for peaceful settlement of dis-
putes in the CIS area with full respect
for sovereignty rights, and for the
development of voluntary regional and
economic cooperation:
- 
promotion of a constructive dialogue
between Russia. the EU and other wes-
tern partners and of cooperation in
international organi sations :
- 
fostering Russia's commitment to peace-
keeping in accordance with the UN
Charter and OSCE principles and
objectives. "
28. However, in view of the results of the par-
liamentary elections in Russia in December 1995.
the prospect of presidential elections in June
1996. indications that the 
_eeneral direction of
l0
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Russia's foreign policy is being called into ques-
tion by several of the parties involved in the elec-
tions, and the absence of any indicators making it
possible to predict the reaction of the Russian
electorate, it is to be hoped that western countries.
while encouraging the forces of democracy within
Russia. will not give that country undertakings
that are too specific, and will maintain the where-
withal to respond to any new challenge Russia
may present. Under no circumstances must the
security and cohesion of Europe be endangered by
the vicissitudes of Russia's domestic policy, even
if the common aim of the European Union coun-
tries is to maintain and foster mutual trust.
29. On the subject of Euro-Mediterranean rela-
tions, the Conference held in Barcelona on 2J and
28 November 1995 under European Council
chairmanship identified a number of factors rela-
ting to a political and security partnership whose
aim would be to establish a common area of peace
and stability. Among other things, the participants
expressed:
" 
... their conviction that the peace, stability
and security of the Mediterranean region
are a common asset which they pledge to
promote and strengthen by all means at
their disposal. To this end they agree to
conduct a strengthened political dialogue at
regular intervals, based on observance of
essential principles of international law,
and reaffirm a number of common objec-
tives in matters of internal and external sta-
bility. "
Furthermore. the conference participants under-
took to:
" 
- 
consider practical steps to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear. chemical and
biological weapons as well as excessive
accumulation of conventional arms:
- 
refrain from developing military capa-
city beyond their legitimate defence
requirements, at the same time reaffirm-
ing their resolve to achieve the same
degree of security and mutual confi-
dence with the lowest possible levels
of troops and weaponry and adherence
to CCWI
- 
promote conditions likely to develop
good-neighbourly relations among
themselves and support processes
aimed at stability, security, prosperity
and regional and subregional coopera-
tion;
- 
consider any confidence- and security-
building measures that could be taken
between the parties with a view to the
creation ofan " area ofpeace and stabi-
lity in the Mediterranean ". including
the long-term possibility of estab-
lishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact
to that end. "
30. In particular, however, it is the apparent
powerlessness of the European Union to reach
agreement on common policy and action regard-
ing the conflict in the Balkans that has raised
serious doubts about whether the fundamental
objective of the European Union as set out
in Article B of the Maastricht Treaty can be
achieved, namely:
- 
" to assert its identity on the international
scene, in particular through the imple-
mentation of a common foreign and
security policy " (CFSP).
31. The authors of the Reflection Group's final
report' therefore take the view that the Union
must have greater capacity for external action and
note that:
" The current possibilities offered by the
Treaty have provided some positive results.
We believe, however, that the time has
come to provide this common policy with
the means to function more effectively.
The Union today needs to be able to play its
part on the international stage as a factor for
peace and stability. Although an economic
power today. the Union continues to be
weak in political terms ...
We think that the Conference must find
ways and means of providing the Union
with a greater capacity for external action
in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.
It must be capable of identifying its inter-
ests, deciding on its action and implemen-
ting it effectively. Enlargement will make
this task more difficult. but also make it
even more imperative. "
32. This task should fall within a more general
fiamework of establishing an efficient and demo-
cratic Union. According to the authors":
" The objective of the 1996 reform. as defi-
ned in the terms of reference and given the
challenge of enlargement, is to ensure that
the Union functions efficiently and with
legitimacy; in short, the purpose is to
improve the quality of the way the Union
works. To this end it will be necessary to
clarify its objectives and refine the instru-
ments that serve those objectives, bearing
in mind that in future the intention is not
8. Reflection Group's report: first part; a strategy for
Europe. section III.
9. Reflection Group's report: second palt. paragraphs 74 and
15.
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that the Union should necessarily have
more powers but that it should perform its
tasks better.
The instruments of the Union, that is to say
its institutions, rules, resources and poli-
cies, are not ends in themselr'es but are
there to serve the objectives and tasks ofthe
Union. The aim of the reform must be to
ensure that the adjustments decided at the
conference will enable the instruments of
the Union to operate according to the cri-
teria of efficiency, democracy. solrdarity.
transparenc)' and subsidiarity." ...
33. It is primarily to WEU that improved ope-
ration of the CFSP is of fundamental interest
because if the CFSP fails to operate and the neces-
sary decisions cannot be taken, any undertaking
given by the WEU member countries in accord-
ance u'ith the Maastricht Declaration 
- 
whcreby
WEU is to be built up in stages as the def'ence
cornponent o1'the European Union and to this end
is prepared, at the request of the European Union,
to elaborate and implernent decisions and actions
of the Union which have def'ence irnplications 
-
would remain purely a lnatter of form.
34. Moreover. WEU cannot confine itself to
defining its future relations with the European
Union. without grr ing its views on appropriilte
rurethods of improving the operation of the CFSP.
WEU not only has the right but also the duty to set
ont its position on this matter, first, because the
rurodified Brussels Treaty lays an obligation on the
Council to take the necessary nreasures to " pro-
mote the unitv and encourage the progressive
integration of Europe ", second. because Article
J.4.2 of the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that WEU
is an inte_sral part of the der,'elopment of the Euro-
pean Union, and third, becanse according to that
Treaty. the CFSP includes all questions related to
the security of the Union, including the eventual
fraurin,s of a cornr.non defence policy. which
might in time lead to a common det-ence.
35. This description of the CFSP accordingly
takes in the areas at the very core of WEU's
responsibilities. The discussion on the reform of
the CFSP is therefore of interest to the WEU
Council and the Assembly. Thus your Rapporteur
feels it is most regrettable that the Council docu-
r.nenf on the " WEU contribution to the European
Union intergovernmental conference of 1996 " r0
should have set itself so restrictive a brief in exa-
rnining onl1, the institutional aspects of future
relations between WEU and the European Union,
without commenting on CFSP reform. on the sub-
ject of which rnany proposals har e been put for-
u'ard which. if adopted. nright have direct conse-
quences for WEU and its Treaty. Your Rapporteur
therefore intends to refer in the present document
to the problems relatins to the reform of the CFSP.
taking as the point of departure the contmitments
given by the WEU member countrics in their
Maastricht Declaration which set the organisation
a threefbld objective:
- 
build up WEU in stages as the defence
component of the European Union:
- 
develop WEU as a means to strengtherr
the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance:
- 
strengthen WEU's operational role.
36. The Maastricht Treaty offers onll, two rea-
sons for thc need fbr revision of Title V. the first
being to further " the objective of the present
treaty ". The second is the so-called " 1998 dead-
line ". Howcver paragraph -15 of the Council's
document on the WEU contribution to the inter-
governlnental conference acknowledges that the
" need to review the present ESDI (European
security and defence identity) institutional fiame-
u'ork is not only due to the tirne limits established
in the treaties. The rel,iew of the present frame-
work must also consider the fundamental objec-
tives which institutional arrangements in the
defence and securitv fields are intended to serve,
and the existing constraints. Public opinion in the
nember states demands def-ence arrangements
that are credible and can be relied upon to u'ork in
practice ... "
31 . The reference to the demands of public opi-
nion in securitv and def'ence ntatters may seent
rash since. in point of fact, these are rarely press-
in-e except when an immediate threat is present.
Conversely. the economic problerns Europe is
currently erperiencing are in many countries
giving rise to claims for " peace dividends " in the
form of substantial reductions in defence budgets.
Hor,',er,'er one can concur with the Council's
observation that these are the tundarnental objec-
tives that must be taken into account in any
review of the current provisions. Your Rapportcur
has endeavoured to identify them in this section.
III. The conditions for achieving
the desired objectives
38. As Mr Soell demonstrated in his report " a
European security policy " ". the main European
countries still have differing interests when it
coures to toreign. security and def-ence policy. It
only takes a comparison o1'the British, French and
German white papers to confirnt this. Whether
one likes it or not. one cannot ignore what the Bri-
tish Government states in its memorandum of
t2
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2 March 1995'r on the treatment of European
def'ence matlers at the 1996 intergovernmental
cont'erence:
" many nations have, as well as their com-
mon defence responsibilities shared with
their Europcan partners, a nutnber of natio-
nal responsibjlities. As well as the United
Kingdom, several of our partners have, for
example, responsibilities flowing from his-
tory in respect of territories and citizens
around the globe. Thus. for exatnple, the
United Kingdom has responsibility for the
det'ence. external afTairs and internal secu-
rity of our Dependent Territories such as
the Falkland Islands, and France has res-
ponsibilities towards its Overseas Depart-
ments and Territories ".
39. The British Governrnent takes the l'iew that
each country ntust preserve its fieedom to act in
the defence of its national interests, without being
subject to any constraints. In contrast, the German
Government believes that gol'ernments should be
prepared to go along with majority decisions even
where they conflict with their own preferences.
This is a fundamental aspect of the issue and the
first task should be to ascertain the positions and
interests of all the member countries of WEU and
of the European Union in this respect. Such illter-
ests should be defined in respect o1 specific areas
such as crisis management. Everybody thinks that
the decision to take part in military operations as
part of Petersberg-type missions will remain a
national prerogative. Would it be possible, for ins-
tance. to a-uree in WEU on the European corps
intervening in Burundi in the event of a deteriora-
tion in the situation in that country, as suggested
by Mr De Decker. Chairman of the Libelal Group
of the Assernbly, on l2 January 1996?'^ Thc ques-
tion should be put to the Council and, more parti-
cularly, to those countrics contrtbuting to the
European corps because if their response was
negative or even conditronal, there would be a
case for asking whether the creation of the unit
helps to promote European action in the world or
whether, on the contrary. it actually tnakes it more
difficult.
-t0. The collective work done by the WEU
member countries. associate urembers, associate
partners and observers, which produced a docu-
ment on " European security: a cotnmon concept
of the 27 WEU countries " has been useful for the
purpose of making a 
-slobal assessment of the
risks that might affect European security in the
future. But as far as any response to such risks is
concerned. it is only in the light of the lessons
learnt from the Yugoslav conflict that the docu-
ment rightly pornts out that " the political aims of
Document A/WEU/DG (95) 9 of I I March 199-5.
Emopa. No. 66.1-1. l3 Januar'1, 1996.
the mission must be set out clearly frotn the
start ". ln order for that to be done. the respective
interests of the countries concerned must first be
identified and yet there is still no sign of the rvhite
paper on European security.
,+1. The same approach has to be taken on
concepts for a comtnon defence policy and for
defence itself. The WEU Council started work in
this area by producing preliminary conclusions on
the fonnulalion of a common European def'ence
policy, which were issued at the meeting of the
Council of Ministers in Noordwijk on 1.1 Novem-
ber 199-l ''. The document contains apt definitions
that rnay be regarded as a programme of work yet
to be carried out:
" A comtt-ton European def'ence policy will
need to be forrnulated against the back-
ground of a thorough analysis of Europeart
security, interests and should take as its
basic assumption the collective cooperative
approach to defence. as established in col-
lective defence alliances under the Brussels
and Washington treaties. It should take into
account the fbllowing four Ievels of Euro-
pean responsibilities and interests in the
field of defence:
- 
WEU governments have a direct respon-
sibility for the security and defence of
their own peoples and territories.
- 
WEU governments have a responsibility
to project the security and stability pre-
sently enjoyed in the West throughout
the u,hole of Europe.
- 
WEU governments have an interest, in
order to reintorce European security. in
fostering stability in the southern Medi-
terranean countries.
- 
WEU 
-sovernments are ready to take ontheir share of the responsibility fbr the
promotion of security, stability and the
values of democracy in the wider world,
including through the execution of peace-
keeping and other crisis-management
measures under the authority of the Uni-
ted Nations Security Council or the
CSCE, acting either independently or
through WEU or NATO. They are also
ready to address new' security challen-ees
such as humanitarian emergencies; proli-
feration: terrorism. international crime
and environtnental risks. including those
related to disarmament and the destruc-
tion of nuclear and chetuical weapons ".
t2
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" The full development of a common
defence policy will require a common
assessment and definition of the require-
ments and substance of a European defence
which would first require a clear definition
of the security challenges facing the Euro-
pean Union and a determination of appro-
priate responses ".
The next sentence is in fact the one that spells out
the fundamental task ahead:
" This will in turn depend upon a judgement
of the role the European Union wishes to
play in the world and the contribution it
wishes to make to security in its immediate
neighbourhood and in the wider world ".
42. In their Noordwijk Declaration. the WEU
ministers said their aim was that " the present
policy document will evolve into a c'onrprehensiye
common European defence policy statement in
the perspective of the intergovernmental confe-
rence of 1996". But this undertaking was less
strong in the Lisbon Declarationrs in which the
ministers confined themselves to reaffirming their
resolve to work, on the basis of the preliminary
conclusions adopted in Noordwijk, on the lormu-
lation of a common European defence policy. " to
ensure that this policy can effectively take shape
in the years ahead ".
43. The result is that the document on " Euro-
pean security: a common concept of the 27 WEU
countries " does no more than analyse the risks
and gives no definition of the common European
detence policy. There is therefore no E,uropean
concept as yet in this area.
44. What is also missing is a discussion in the
relevant European institutions. and particularly in
WEU, about the future role of rtLrclear deterrence.
As your Rapporteur has already stressed in his
previous report on " the intergovernmental confe-
rence and the organisation of the Europe of secu-
rity and defence "'u, it is true that the role nuclear
forces can play as a deterent is mentioned in the
document on " European security: a common
concept of the 2l WEU countries " but it goes no
further than the observation that the independent
nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France
contribute to the allies' global deterrence and
security. Austria. Ireland and Sweden have poin-
ted out that they did not play a part in formulating
the Alliance's strategic concept and were not
involved in The Hague platform of WEU. As for
Denmark, it does not want to become a full mem-
ber of WEU mainly because of the nuclear deter-
rent problem. But the idea of developing a Euro-
pean defence concept without tackling the
problem of nuclear deterence is inconceivable.
Docunrent 1455. 15 May 1995.
Docunrent 1.195. l6 November 1995
.15. In a speech on 8 September 1995, the
French Prime Minister, Mr. Jupp6, explained that
France proposed to examine with some of its
allies the question of how its nuclear arsenal
might contribute to Europe's defence. This propo-
sal has already prompted reactions that are so
diverse and contradictory that it hardly seems
likely that Europeans will be able to reach agree-
ment on a common policy in the important area of
defence. Up till now, the Council has said it would
not contemplate including this matter on the agen-
da of its meetings.
46. Since the majority of member countries are
convinced that the principle of national sove-
reignty must continue to govern relations between
European countries on defence matters and that
the intergovernmental nature of decision-making
requires consensus'-, it will be necessary to:
(cu) ensure that concepts and national
actions are harmonised. and
(b) formulate a common security and
defence policy.
IV Appropriate methods for achieving
a common security and defence policy
l. The various instittttional methods
11. All the member countries of the European
Union and of WEU have accepted the provisions
of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty establishing a
common foreign and security policv (CFSP)
which " shall include all questions related to the
security of the Union, including the eventual
framing of a common defence policy, which
might in time lead to a common defence ". These
same countries have also accepted Article C of the
Maastricht Treaty according to which the Union is
to be served by a single institutional framework
which shall ensure the consistency and continuity
of the activities caried out in order to attain its
objectives, particularly in external relations and
security. Lastly. all the member countries of the
European Union and of WEU have accepted
Article D whereby the European Council shall
provide the Union with the necessary impetus for
its development and shall define the general poli-
tical guidelines thereof.
.18. The Council of WEU for its part was crea-
ted both to pursue a policy of peace and streng-
then the security of its member countries and to
promote the unity and encourage the progressive
integration of Europe. This aim cannot be challen-
ged any more than can the will of the WEU mem-
ber countries that WEU should be an integral part
of the development of the European Union. On
17. The Reflection Group's report: second part. paragraph
172
t5.
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the basis of these fundamental principles the
WEU member countries have given a series of
undertakings, contained in their Declaration
annexed to the Maastricht Treaty wtth a view to
strengthening the role of WEU. in the longer-term
perspective of a common defence policl' within
the European Union which might in time lead to a
comnron defence. compatible with that of the
Atlantic Alliance, as organised by NATO.
49. Unless it wishes to pursue an entirely new
policy constituting a departure from its original
aims, any steps taken by WEU as regards the 1996
intergovernrnental conference must be consistent
and in conformity with the earlier undertakings
given by its members when signing the Maastricht
Treaty. Your Rapporteur is convinced that none of
the member countries wishes to change the course
set by the Maastricht Treaty. That said, WEU and
its member countries also have a responsibility to
make it understood that security and defence are
highly sensitive areas and that the problems lin-
ked to the establishment of a true European iden-
tity in this area will not be resolved simply by
transferring them from one institution to another.
50. The reason why the signatory states gave
WEU a remit in the Maastricht Treaty to elaborate
and implement decisions and actions of the Union
which have defence implications, at the request of
the Union, was that it was not possible to organise
defence within the structures of the European
Union itself.
- 
Five European Union member countries
are not prepared to participate in the
defence of the territory of the Union on
the basis of the obligations contained in
the modified Brussels Treaty. Conse-
quently their government and parliamen-
tary representatives who have full rights
in the executive and parlianientary
bodies of the European Union have only
observer status in WEU 
- 
a situation
which has not changed since the coming
into force of the Maastricht Treaty.
- 
Three European members of the Atlantic
Alliance. Iceland, Norway and Turkey,
which are associate tnembers of WEU.
are prepared to participate lully in the
det-ence of Europe but are not European
Union nembers. Their government
representatives are entitled to participate
in most WEU Council activrties without
acceding to the modified Brussels
Treaty. Their parliamentarians are repre-
sented at WEU Assembly sessions as
associate members of the Assembly, but
not in the European Parliament.
- 
WEU has taken specific measures in res-
pect of nine Central European countries
which have become associate partners in
WEU, enabling them to participate under
certain conditions in the Council's activi-
ties. Similarly. the WEU Assembly has
granted the parliamentary representa-
tives of associate partner countries per-
manent observer status together with the
right to sit in the Assembly, and on its
committees, without voting rights.
Conversely, the relations the European
Union has established up to now with the
Central European countries concerned
are of a different order and their parlia-
mentarians are not represented in the
European Parliament.
51. The member countries of WEU and the
European Union consider that the defence of
European territory under the terms of Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty should be assured by means of
the structures set up by NATO fbr that purpose. It
was therefore decided at Maastricht that WEU
would not only be developed as the defence com-
ponent of the European Union but also as a means
to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance.
52. This Atlantic dimension to WEU, as set out
as early as 1954 in Article IV of the modified
Brussels Treaty, has been strengthened considera-
bly in recent months, specifically since France
resolved to become more closely involved in mili-
tary cooperation within NATO and even to partici-
pate in the Nuclear Committee. which should pro-
vide an opportunity to engage in a discussion on
the role of the French deterrent. According to the
French government's new line of thinking, France
will be seeking to achieve the aims of a common
European defence within the framework of both
the Atlantic Alliance and the European Unionr*.
-53. If the majority of France's European part-
ners were ready to follow it down this road, it
would be difficult for them then to sustain the
arguments in favour of option C. as outlined in the
" WEU contribution to the European Union inter-
governmental conference of 1996 ". This option
effectively provides for the transf'er of all defence
matters to the CFSP on the basis of a new Treaty
on European Union. either according to the Cl
model allowing countries not in a position to sub-
scribe a collective defence undertaking to be
exempted fiorn participating or according to the
C2 model which suggests the integration of only
those aspects relating to crisis management into
the CFSP and the adoption of a defence protocol
annexed to the new Treaty on European Union
including a collective defence commitment for
which rnember states might opt under conditions
yet to be determined.
18. International Herald Tribunt- and Le Frgaro. 17 Januarl'
I 996.
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54. These two versions of option C therefore
envisage the disappearance of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, and of WEU. and the incorporation of
part of the Treaty's provisions in a new treaty. The
functions of most of the WEU bodies. including
the Assemblv. would be transferred to the equivu-
lent bodies of thc European Union.
55. This first begs the question of rvhether
France, the United Kin_edorn and other member
countries might not be inclined to give greatr-r
prioritl' to the Atlantic Alliance than ro the Euro-
pean Union, not rtrerely in ternrs of E,uropean
defence. but perhaps also in tenns of the organisa-
tion of security in Europe. Furthennore. oprion C
involves a number of risks w'hich should not be
ignored: first. it might prornpr rhe suggestion fiom
those in favour of the Atlantic Alliance and its
military structure remaining the principal 
-euaran-tors of Europe's defence. that thc- new treaty
should refer only to Article 
-5 of the Washington
Treaty and not contain any specific European
Union obligation. or even that there should be a
" non-participation " option. Even if this did not
arise, the possibility cannot be ruled out of a deb-
ate on the inclusion iu the Treaty, on European
Union of a mutual assistance clause and on the
content and scope thereof. in the course of which
many differing viewpoints might emerge. Refe-
rence might be made in this connection to the
political differences that still exist berween
Greece and Turkey and the fact that at the time o1'
Greece's accession to WEU, the possibility of
Article V applying to a possible conflict between
the two countries was ruled out. The risk that the
nesotiation of a neu' treaty rnight lead to a number
of such exceptions, and ultin-rately to a weakening
of its signatories' cornmitments, is high.
56. It ll,ould be el'en more dangerous to open a
debatc on the wording of au assistance clause that
nevertheless appears to be cssential. Can one in
fact he sure that all sovernrnents interpret " an
arnred attack in Europe " or " all... aid and assis-
tance in their power " in the same way. Will they
all a-qree in considering that this implies resorrins
to nuclear weapons?
51. The negotiations on thc introduction of a
collective defence clause will not necessarily lead
to a more efTective def-ence or greater security fbr
Europe's citizens. There are many other uncer-
tainties besides. We do not actually know which
members of the European Union. albeit at present
full members of WEU. would be prepared to enter
into a new collectiye def-ence cornrnitment under
the Union umbrella. Furthermore. this would
create a urulti-speed Europe u,ithin the fiantework
of the Union 
- 
precisel), the opposite of the pur-
pose of inteerating WEU's functions into the
European Union. At present. responsibility for
assessing rvhether the conditions necessary for
implernenting a collective defence are nret by
countries appll,ing fur accession to WEU lies
solely rvith the states party to the modified Brus-
sels Treaty. in cooldination rvith the Atlantic
Alliance. Would it be desirable to cxtend it to
other countries'l
58. In point ol'fact. in the event of any transf'er
of the decision-nrakin-e process in this particular
area, the number of institutions that might have ttt
be involved would increase substantially. In the
first place, those membcr countries of the Euro-
pean Union which have opted not to participate in
a collective defence would har,'e a nurnber of pos-
sibilities to inf-luence choices, especially financial
choices, if actions with defence intplications were
to be funded jointly out of the conrmunity budget.
In this case, not only the European Commiss"ion
but also the European Parliament would be invol-
ved iu the decision-rlaking process. which would
certainly not make it lrny eusier.
59. The idea of including crisis mana_eemenr in
the Treaty on European Union and assignin-e res-
ponsibilitv for it to the CFSP under option C
might also raise serious difficulties. The docu-
rnent on WEU's contribution to the intergovet-n-
mental cont'erence does not contain any clear indi-
cation tltat the terms of Article VIII.2 of the
modified Brussels Treatv. ar present the legal
basis tbr all WEU action in the field of crisis pie-
vention and manaqement. would be incorporated
in the new tl'eaty. The document discusses incor-
poratin-r the relel'ant provisions ttf the modified
Brussels Treaty into the rnain body of the Treaty,
on European Union. mentioning Artrcles IV V VI
and VII " as rvell as provisions coverins the
Petersbers tasks ".
60. In this event, still uith reference to the
sanre docuntent. all Petersberg-typc- operations
would be dealt with under thc CFSP. What adr an-
tages would this have'l Accordins to the authors,
in the operational sphere this process would eli-
minatc duplications in decision-making which
can delay action when different organisations are
involved. " Joint actions with defence implica-
tions (including crisis rnanagenrent and peacekee-
ping) would be rnore feasible and would have the
advantases of joint financing, either from the
Community budget or through particular arrall-
gements ".
61. Hower,er the fact of its responsibilities
beins transferred to the CFSP would no1 make
WEU operational any sooner. Decisions would
not necessarily be quicker if taken in the CFSp
framework. The opposite will be true unless the
CFSP can be made to work so as to achieve its
goal of assertin-e Europe's identity on the interna-
tional stage. If the CFSP does not enable the
necessary decisions to be taken, neither the inte-
gration of WEU or its Treaty in the Union. nor the
various modcls seeking to subordinate WEU in
l6
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one way or another to the Union's institutions
(variants of option B) can produce the desircd
results. narnely greater consistency and effectil'e-
ness in Europe's involvement in international
afTairs. As has been emphasised above, the trans-
1-er of crisis mana-qelnent to the CFSP. far from
reduciug the number o1 decision-making attthori-
ties. would increase it considerably'.
62. The institutional specificitl'that has alu'ays
characterised WEU is thc' legal basis provided b1'
its Treaty. which includes prol'isious both for a
traditional def'ence alliance such as thc- Atlantic
Alliance and tor promotin-9 the progressive inte-
gration of Europc. a project which 
-uoes beyond
def-ence and security concerns. WEU. which, like
NATO is an intergovernmental or-ganisation
whose work and standing depends on the u'ill of
the member governments, has always wavered
betrveen twcl options, with solle governments
pref-erring that the European security and defence
identity should be achieved in a European Union
framework and others insisting on the need to
develop that identity within the Atlantic Alliunce.
63. These two possibilitics have always been
presentc-d as complenlentary rather than contra-
dictory'. Nevertheless. a I'undamental choice was
made by statin-e in the Maastricht Treaty that
WEU was " an integral palt of the developntent of
the Union ". As Mr de Charette, the French
Ministel for Foreign Affairs obsen'cd " WEU
must work with the Atlantic Alliance on behalf of
the European Union " which for Mr Millon. the
Frc-nch Defence Minister. means that " Euro-
peans. rn other words the relevant cor.rntries of the
European Union and WEU. must be able to
express theurselvcs within the Alliance in an orga-
nised way ... this rnight. for exatnple. be throu-sh
the country that holds the WEU prcsidettcy " ''.
61. If France's new attitude. which to an extent
supports that of the United Kingdorn in advocating
developn-rent o1'a European secttrity and det'ence
identity within the framework of the Atlantic
Alliance. becornes more marked. attempts to intro-
duce aspects ol the contntunity proccss int()
security and defence decision-tnaking u'ill be cot'-
respondingly weakened. Nevertheless one funda-
mental task still has to be completed, that of
" bringin-q the fbreign and def'ence policies of each
of our countries significantly closer together on
the basis of clear aims and priorities " as President
Chirac and Chanccllor Kohl requested in theirjoint letter, dated 6 December 1995, to the Spanish
presidency of the European Union. The purpose is
to brin-e about a convelgence of national policies.
The preferred nrethod of achieving this up to now
has been through institutional refortrt. But there
may be other ways.
l9 Address gir'en b1' Mr Millon. Frr'nch
Det'ence. to the IHEDN on 19 Decembct l99-5.
2. Other ways of achiet'ittg convergence
of national policies
65. Idcntification of national interests is clearly
not enough. Ways havc to be found which will
lead. though a gradual process. to a convergence
of national fbreign affairs. security and defence
policies. But what critcria are to be used'l This
will be' the flrst question to resolve. One might
draw upon the method devised for the CFSP in the
Maastricht Treaty by which the Council decides
case by case and on the basis of general guidelines
issued b1' the European Council " that a matter
should be the subject of joint action " (Article
J.3. I of the Maastricht Treaty ).
66. The report of the European Council on the
functioning of the Treaty on European Union.
published on 6 April 1995, states that the joint
actions agreed upon until that date col'ered areas
as varied as the defrnition of overall strategies
towards Ru'anda and Ukraine. the sending of
observers to the parliamentarv elections in Russiu.
the Stability Pact. the process of transitiou
to democracy rn South Africa. the Middle East
peace process, non-proliferaticln of nuclear u'ea-
pons. furmer Yugoslavia aud especially the
convoying of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herze-
govina and support to the civilian administration
of Mostar.
61 . Agaln. according to this report. decisions
were normally taken by consensus and qualified
rna.yority voting, use ol-which is authorised under
Article J.3.2 of the Maastricht Treaty, has not
been used for implementing actions approved.
The results so far obtained by the CFSP have been
nruch criticised and have led the European
Union's Reflection Group on the preparation of
the intergovernlnental conference to give thou-ght
to establishing criteria better suitcd to achiet ing a
common policy. According to the flnal report of
this group:
" 
... some members seek a more specific
staternent of the Union's fundatnental inter-
ests. as referred to in Article J.l .2. Their
definition in relation to geographical areas
has been suggested by some. Other
menrbers see the nccd for definition of
con.luron interest. not through a geographi-
cal approach. but through common pl'iori-
ties such as reinforced diplomatic solidarity
between membcr states and the upholding
and defence of human rights and demo-
cracy ".
68. Your Rapporteur is convinced that establish-
ing suitable criteria tor achieving convergence of
ruational policies is an absolutely essential task.
This undertaking should be caried torward in the
fiamework of the Union and. above all. within
WEU, in order to facilitate decision-making in
defence-related areas. The " Preliurinary Conclu-
N{inrster of
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sions on the lbrmulation of a Common European
Defence Policy " and the document entitled
" European security. a common concept of the 2'7
WEU countries " already give important insight
into the definition of contmon interests. but these
must be made more specific, as has already been
done on a piecemeal basis in relation to such areas
as the protection of Europe's economic interests
or the security of Europeau citizens throughout
the world.
69. Reference might be made in this connection
to work on encouraging cooperation betwecn
WEU and the European Union as regards consular
protection and the implementation of evacuation
plans in the event of a crisis in countries such as
Zaire. Angola, Yemen and Rwanda. However
what is missing is a general strategy, adopted by all
WEU member countries. which WEU could use to
underpin joint actions in the event of a crisis affec-
ting European security. In order to develop this
common strateg),, the Council must draw up a pro-
gramme which takes account of the interests of
each country and its perception of the criteria for
bringing about progressive convergence of natio-
nal policies until a cornmon policy is reached. In
this connection one might draw on the research
that has led to the establishment of common crite-
ria for the implementation of a common monetary
policy, (convereence principle) without necessarily
going so far as to lix deadlines by which all thejointly determined criteria must be met.
70. To summarise, y,our Rapporteur is con-
vinced that the basic thrust of efforts to give Eur-
ope a real ability to act in concert on the inter-
national stage should be directed towards
converging interests rather than unifying insti-
tutions. This does not detract fiom the importance
of the latter, but it can only result from a sradual
process which cannot be ordained in the same
way as if it were merely a question of simplifying
an administrative procedure. The oft-used argu-
ment that public opinion would not understand
why different organisations and institutions
should be necessary in order to pursue one and the
same goal does not stand up. Trying to find easy
answers to complex problems is not necessarily
an effective way of going about things. Public
opinion has no trouble in understanding, provided
that those with political responsibility are able to
explain lnatters in the right way.
V Implications for WEU thinking
in the framework of the 1996
int e rgov ernme ntal c o nfere n c e
ll. The intergovernmental conference will
have to tackle the problent of Europe's security,
and defence from two different angles, that of a
global concept of a future European Union which
can only become a Union in the proper sense if it
takes on board all the issues and fiom the point
of view of what it is possible and desirable to
achieve immediately in order to enable it to:
(r) secure those aspects of a common
security policy that are essential for
the functioning of the community. in
the form in which it emerges from the
i ntergovernmental conference,
(lr) make such advances as are rmmedia-
tely feasible to\4'ards a Union with
u'ider responsibilities;
(lril provide Europe with the instruments
necessary for its defence and for orga-
nising irs security.
'72. In your Rapporteur's view. this involves
three separate approaches which rt does not seem
possible under present circumstances to combine
in a single approach as those in favour of option C
would wish.
13. (i) First, NATO must be mainrained and
strengthened and. in order to do so. it will very
probably have to be reformed in such a way as to
enable its European contponent to exercise grea-
ter political influence in the Alliance's decisions,
while ensuring that an American presence in
Europe is maintained. In view of the United
States' mrlitary power, this is essential to the
Alliance's deterrent capability. For as long as
certain r-nember countries remain outside the
Alliance and, even more especially, if they claim
to pursue a policy of neutralitv. military organisa-
tion of the Union cannot provide the Alliance with
a European pillar, whereas the rnodified Brussels
Treaty allows WEU to carry out this role more or
less satisfactorily even though Denmark, Iceland,
Norway and Turkey are not involved in taking
certain WEU decisions.
11. (ii) On the other hand, the development of
the CFSP requires that the European Union can
call upon armed forces. However, bearing in mind
the reductions in the armies of European countries
since 1989, it is out of the question that the latter
should split forces which are already inadequate
between several defence or security organisations.
They have tried, with NATO's decision of
January 199-1. then through the creation of multi-
national forces, to organise them in such a way
that they can be placed under NATO command or
WEU authority. depending on needs and circurn-
stances. Moleover, the participation of countries
that are not members or not full members of these
organisations in joint peacekeeping operations
has been exantined and. at times. achieved.
Howe'u'er, there has been little progress on the
implementation of the CJTF fbr over two years.
That being said, there is probably no alternarive
and it is necessary at all costs to obtain the agree-
IIJ
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ment of the American authorities to the applica-
tion of an arrangement whose principle they have
accepted.
15. Similarly, the Maastricht Treaty. in prin-
ciple lays the basis for close cooperation between
WEU and the CFSP, in such a way as to place
WEU forces at the service of the CFSP. However.
the application of this principle has remained
somewhat shaky, essentially because govern-
ments have not managed to reach agreement on
many aspects of how a common policy is to be
achieved. Under these circumstances, it does not
seem desirable to dir,'est the WEU Council of its
responsibilities, which may be exercised, if requi-
red. without intervention from the Union authori-
ties. The CFSP must be able to mobilise armed
forces through WEU. Several institutional proce-
dures for achieving this have been suggested. in
particular the idea of making the WEU Secretary-
General the Secretary-General of the CFSP which
was discussed in some detail in the second report
of the high-level Group of Experts on the CFSP "'.
The WEU member countries cannot see any
serious problem with this, but the same view may
not be taken by non-member countries which
would be automatically debarred from holding
such a post.
76. In actual fact, procedures, however excel-
lent they might be. cannot solve the basic problem
raised by the presence in the European Union of
countries whose l'iews on security and defence
differ widely. Whatever the framework of a joint
military action. it is for states themselves to decide
whether or not to take part. Agreement among
them can produce a decision binding all or some
of them and the greater homogeneity of WEU
countries, at least in foreign policy and defence
matters, combined with the flexibility the organi-
sation has under Arlicle VIII of the Treaty, makes
it more probable that agreement can be reached in
the restricted framework of WEU rather than in
the wider one of the European Union. It seetns
wise, therefore, to pursue two lines of action
which are not in conf-lict: allow WEU to retain its
political prerogatives and place it at the service of
the CFSP.
71. (iil) As the Treaty of Maastricht points out,
strengthening WEU should lead to a stronger
European Union. In political terms, this strengthen-
ing can only be achieved by governments being
prepared to encompass the concerns of their part-
ners within their foreign and defence policy. This
is still a lons way off as shown by the fact that no
government has ever invoked paragraph 3 of
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty even
20. Hrgh-level Group of Experts on the CFSP. second report.
European foreign and securlty policy towards the year 2000:
ways and means to estabhsh genuine credibrlity, Brusseis. 28
Norember i995. paragraph 23.
in such important cases as the Suez operation in
1956 or, nlore recently. the Falklands or France's
various interventions in Aliica. It is also evident
in the disagreement that surfhced between mern-
ber countries in 199-5 about the series of French
nuclear tests. Until the situation changes. no inter-
national institution will be in a position either to
take the place of states in order to promote a com-
mon defence policy. and the CFSP will only be
able to take elfective responsibility for matters
which everyone would agree in regarding as rele-
vantly minor, as is currently the case.
78. On the military level. the consistency with
which states have made plain their determination
that their decisions should not be subject to any
international authority engenders some scepti-
cism about any proliferation of multinational
units or commands. whatever the context. Unless
there is specific agreement for each operation bet-
ween the countries involved in it. such units and
commands will either not be able to intervene or.
in the event o[ crisis. will risk finding themselves
deprived. as a result of national decisions, of the
means which thev have in principle been granted.
These specific agreements may lcad to joint
action, as was the case for WEU naval operations
in the Gulf and the Red Sea. They are necessary' in
order to provide one or more member countries
with the means. especially logistic means, which
others in turn have placed at the service of the
organisation. This means that their deployment
remains uncertain and that except where Article V
of the modified Brussels Treaty is applied, the
ability of forces assigned to NATO or to WEU to
talie action is unpredictable.
19. However. there are still areas in which
WEU is in a position to strengthen the Union's
capabilities considerably. This is true of areas
where long-term decisions are not dependent on
political decisions in the short term. The achieve-
ments of WEU and its members in space applica-
tions. inasmuch as these involve only observation
and interpretation. make a clear contribution to
Europe's security and def'ence and are conducive
to collectrve decision-making on the basis ofjointly gathered infbrmation. Similarly. the deve-
lopment of the work of WEAG. especially if it
leads to the creation of a European armarnents
agency, should promote interoperability between
the weapon systems of the participant countries
and as a result make the implernentation of joint
political dccisions easier.
80. It therefore seems possible to state that
WEU, as it exists and is developing, is contribu-
ting or has the prospect of bringing to the Euro-
pean Union everything that governments are pre-
pared to make available to it in security and
defence matters. It is undoubtedly true that com-
munication between the CFSP and WEU must be
improved. However, this should not involve insti-
t9
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tutional subordination o1'the one to the other. even
i1'WEU is called upon to intelvene nrorc fr-equeut-
ly and rlrore svstcntatically than in the past in
ordcr to implement decisions taken within the
CFSP franreu,'urk. Indeed. such subordination
would make it more difl'icult to givc operational
eflect to decisions taken by the CFSP itself.
81. Such is. in the r ierv of your Rapporteur. the
frameu'ork in u'hich nteasures to be taken in rela-
tion to WEU should be examined at the intergo-
vernmental conference. The first question this
then raises is the place the modified Brussels
Tleaty will occupf in any legal system which
might emerge fiom the intergovernmental confe-
rence.
82. The prevailing idea until very recently was
that taken up by' the Maastricht Treaty in Article
J.-1. according to u'hich. having in view the date of
1998 in the context of Article XII of the modified
Brussels Trearty'. atier 50 years it would be time to
incorporate into a ner,'' trcitty organising the Euro-
pean Union those parts o1'the modified Brussels
Treatv that remained l'alid. This view now seeu.ls
to hale lost currency' in particular because of the
acce ssion of neutral countries to the Union. It was
moreover based on a tendentious reading of
Article XII which gives each individual signatory
countrv the right to denounce the Treaty as far as
it is concerned but does not specify in any sense
that the Treatv ceases to be in fbrce on any parti-
cular date. There is therefore no legal need to
replace the rnoditied Brussels Treaty with a new
treaty.
83. However. it is quite obvious that certain
aspects of the Treaty have become obsolete, parti-
cularlv those concerning arms limitation and
control. The Council. moreover. by what is no
doubt a disputable though very real decision,
blought this activitl,to an end in April 1995. This
illustrates that 
-uovernntents are entirely capable
of nodit-ying the application of a treaty once they
have reached agrcentent on doing so. without
resorting to the cuurbersonte procedure of levi-
siou. subject to ratil'ication by the parliaments of
r.nernber countries. It cannot therefore be argued
that renegotiation of the Treatv is essential. either
in 1 998 or at anv other date.
8-+. The Treaty in fact has a number of aspccts
which enable it to respond very satisfactorily to
the requirements of the silualion.
(i ) Articles I and II establish obligations
tou'ards the E,uropean Community
and lay the basis for the closest pos-
sible association between WEU and
the European Union.
(ll) Article IV defines the principle of
cooperation wrth NATO based on
transparencv and complementarity as
20
these were defined in the Declalation
on Western European Uniotr adopted
at Maastricht.
/iill Article V. supplenrented by Articles
VII and X. provide the essential basis
for any' comtnon defence policy or
comnton defence as referred to in
Article J.-1.1 of the Maastricht Treaty.
(rr') Article VIII provides the basis both
fbr political and military consultation
u'ithin the framework of the WEU
Council and for the creation of subsi-
diary bodies whose composition and
status may be adapted to the specific
tasks of each.
8-5. It is clear that not all the European Union
mernber states are at preseut prepared to accede to
this Treatl'. palticuliirly Articles IV and V thereof,
and perhaps also, in the case of solrre,
Artrcles VII, VIII and X. Uudcr these circurn-
stances. any step leading to the abolition of the
modil-ied Blussels Trcaty with a view to transfer-
ring its content to a new treaty on Europcan Union
would substantiallv wcaken Europe. both rnilitarily
and politicallv. Bearing in mind that there is no
1998 " deadlrne ". the onlv reasonable solution is
to retain the Treaty as it stands, allow only those
countries tcl accede to it that are resolved to accept
all of the obligations it contains. with the excep-
tion of those relating to armaments limitation and
control which are no longer applied by unanimous
decision of the Council.
86. If the option of maintaining the modified
Brussels Treaty in fbrce is accepted, the possible
solutions to orsanisational and institutional pro-
blems raised by the coexistence of the European
Union and WEU over an indeterminate time-
tiame. can be vieu'ed with relative clarity since the
problems to be resolved are thereby considerably
reduced. Hence it is possible to set them out here.
(r) It woLrld be desrrable to agl'ee that no
country would be allowed to accede to
the modified Brussels Treaty unless it
was already a signatory of the treatics
foundin-rr the E,uropean Union and
NATO. These are the logical conse-
quences of Articles I, II and IV of the
Treaty. However. accolding to the
Declaration by the WEU mernber
countries that is appended to the
Maastricht Treaty. rnembership of the
European Union constiLutes a pt'econ-
dition for entry to WEU. According to
that Declaration. " members of the
European Union are invited to accede
to WEU on conditions to be agreed in
accordance with Article XI of the
modified Brussels Treaty. or to be-
corne observers if thev so wish ".
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It is norv the case that there is a grow-
ing number of WEU metnber states
that consider that one of the " condi-
tions to be agreed " should be preci-
sell' that a candidate country gains
admission to NATO. This is fully
consistent u,'ith the arguments put for-
ward by your Rapporteur but at the
present time none of the countries
concerned, namely' Austria, Finland
and Sweden. intends to accede to the
modified Brussels Treaty. Moreover,
" other European urember states of
NATO " that are not members of the
European Union were invited in the
aforementioned Declaration " to
become associate members of WEU
in a rvay which rvill give them the pos-
sibility of participating fully in the
activities of WEU ". This is how Ice-
land. Noru,ay and Turkey became
WEU associate members without
acceding to the Treaty itself. The
Assembll' has on several occasions
expressed its dissatistaction with this
solution which discrtminates against
thosc counlries that are pilrticipating
fully in Europe's defence, and it has
recommended the Council to allow
them. if they so rvish. to become firll
members of WEU.
The Committee discussed this problem
a-9ain at its meeting on 26 January 1996
in Strasbourg and decided to recom-
mend that the Council reconsider the
man)'requests the Assembly has made
to that end. This action does not invali-
date the principle described above
given that accession to the modified
Brussels Treaty by the three associate
mernber countries (one of which has
for a long time been a candidate for
membership of the European Union)
is bound to bring thcm closet' to thc
Europeau Union and the CFSP.
(ll) It would be essential lbr a duly empo-
wered representative of WEU, in
other uords the Secretary-Gencral or
his representative. to participate in all
CFSP activities in order to intbrm the
representatives of the countries
concerned of the possibilities WEU
offers in terms of implementing the
CFSP u'herever it has military inipli-
cations and of directing the work of
the WEU bodies in such a way that
they are able to respond to the needs
of the Union. Conversely. for the rea-
sons referred to above, your Rappor-
teur fears that any arrangement which
entrusted the CFSP secretariat to the
WEU Secretarl'-Gcneral might prove
dil-l-icult to uchicve in practice.
(iii) The Fifteen. and not WEU, should
specify the mandate of the CFSP
Secretary and say whether they think
it appropriate to create a specific " Mr
CFSP " post to be held by a politician
or an EC commissioner. WEU can
only' express the wish that the solution
adopted should confer the greatest
authority possible on the person with
responsibilitl, for furthering the CFSP.
(ir') Coordination between the CFSP and
WEU should not affect the WEU
Council's ability, to take decisions in
areas relating to the application of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
(r') Such coordination should not weaken
the credibility' of WEU and its various
bodies as NATO partuers as a result of
constant intelvention by NATO non-
r.nember countries in the organisa-
tion's work. nor should it prevent
WEU from actins as the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance .
(r'r) Agreernent rnust be sought with
NATO both on the implementation of
the CJTF and that of any WEU opera-
tion in which not all NATO members
wish to participate but appror,e in
principle.
(r'll) WEU should develop its military
or-eanisation in such a way to be able,
as necessary, to organise participation
b1 the member countries in operations
desi-ened to ensure European security,
even if NATO did not provide it with
the necessarv means; this applies spe-
cifically to the areas of intelligence,
comnurnd irnd logistics.
(r'lri )Thc siguatory' countries of the nrodi-
fiecl Brussels Trcaty should be urged
not to take any significant military
lrreasure such as extcrnal intervetttiotr
on an\/ grotrnds whatsoet,er, re-orga-
nisation o1'theil anled forces or
deploy'ment of nerv weapons, without
havin-s informed their alLes in accor-
dance u'ith Article VIII.3 of the
Treatl'.
(l.t) The establishment of a European
armaments agenc), should be pursued
u'ithin the framework of WEU taking
account of the pnnciples governing
industrial policy developed by the
European Community. Conversely.
the Community should be requested
2t
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to ensure that this policy meets the
specrfic requirements of the arma-
rnents industries so that mcasures
taken within the framework of either
or_eanisation converge towards a cohe-
rent E,uropean policy on arntaments
production.
81. More specifically. with regard to parlia-
mentary supen,ision. it is common knowledge
that a majority of European Parliament members
would like that Assembly to replace the WEU
Assembly in discharging responsibilities for secu-
ritv and defence matters that the treaties at present
in fbrce do not confer upon the Parliament. Bear-
ing in mind that the WEU Assembly's responsibi-
lities are assi_9ned to it under Article IX of the
rnodified Brussels Treaty. they cannot be taken
awa1, unless the Treaty is revised. which does not
seeur necessary under the present circumstances.
88. However. there are other re.asons. based on
rurore political considerations. tbr hoping that each
of these Assemblies continues to ac1 in its present
are as of responsibility even if there is nothing to
prevent a parliamentary assembly fiont interven-
ing in any area without the partner essential fbr
useful dialogue necessarily being present on the
-qovernment side. The rnost important of these
reasons is that. for as long as defence fbrms part
of an area in which states have made no conces-
sion whatsoever to a supranational organisation in
terms of the exercise of their sovereignty, control
over any joint activity can only have minimum
effectiveness if exercised by delegations drawn
from the parliaments of member countries, since
they are the only real collocutor of those who pre-
pare and implement budgets, manage the armed
forces. provide for their use and decide whether
they are to interr,,ene. The role of the WEU
Assembly is to be a European extension of the
parliaments of mentber countries, while the job
of the European Parliament, which is directly
elected. is to represent the peoples of Europe vis-
a-r is lhe Conlnunily cxecutive.
89. It should also be said that. in whatever fbrm
WEU is considered. be it as l0 signatory states of
the modified Brussels Treaty or 27 countries asso-
ciated in various ways with the organisation, a
European Parliament elected in l5 countries does
not correspond in any sense to the realities of a
security and def-ence Europe. It would lose much
of its authority if ir were to move away from its
fifteen-strong structure which makes it the parlia-
mentary counterpart of the European Union exe-
cutive, while the WEU Assembly. with no legisla-
tive powers and their attendant constraints has
been able to adjust more or less satisfactorily to
the changing shape of WEU.
90. These observations are valid today. They
will obviously no longer carry the same weight
once WEU's responsibilities can be exercised
wrthin the framework of the European Union.
That is doubtless some way off and it would be
premature to e xamine in greater depth how a fede-
ral Europe. in which the distribution of powers
between the Union and its member states might
yet take an untoreseeable turn, should envisage a
form ol parliamentary supervision meeting its
needs.
VI. The WEU Assembly's view
on European security and defence
at the intergov ernmental conference
91. It is difficult to tackle the issue of the
reforms to be made to the European Union institu-
tions as regards security and defence without first
establishing priorities among the objectives being
pursued. Top priority must go to ensuring the
def'ence of Europe because without such a defence,
any fornt of European construction would be
pointless. The absolute priority of putting def'ence
first rneans that relations between Europe and
NATO must take precedence. The second priority
would be to establish a link between the orsanisa-
tion of security and defence and the Euiopean
Union so that the Union's development promotes
the convergence ofnational policies in those areas
leadin_e. in due course, to a Union with wider res-
ponsibilities. In the present conditions, the estab-
lishment of a pan-European security system can
only rank third in the objectives pursued because
such a system can be based only on solid defence
capabilities and firm political guidelines from the
Union. This hierarchy of objectives is not the
result of an ideological choice but is based solely
on realities from which there is no escape.
92. In a situation in which four European
Union members are not members of NATO and
have declared, in different ways, that they intend
to continue the policy of neutrality they have
adopted in the past. putting the requirements of a
common defence at the top of the list of priorities
irnplies that WEU should remain separate from
the Union by virtue both of its Treaty and of its
membership and method of working. The option
of a full and immediate merger of WEU and the
European Union is ruled out as a consequence and
the issue of a possible fourth EU pillar deferred
until circumstances are more favourable.
93. In contrast, making the second priority the
objective of including security and defence
among the Union's activities. in accordance with
the spirit and the letter of the Maastricht Treaty,
implies that an energetic effort should be made [o
converge national policies in this area both in
WEU and in the CFSP and that controversial
issues. such as the responsibilities of certain
member states outside Europe, nuclear weapons,
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the deterrence strategy or the continuation of a
policy of neutrality, should no longer be left
untouched on the sidelines. This means that any'
option advocating an autonomous role for WEU
that takes no account whatsoever of the develop-
ment of the Union and the CFSP and that in fact
separates WEU from the Union, should be firmly
rejected because. far from facilitating efforts to
arrive at a convergence of fbreign and security
policies, such an option would serve to aggravate
differences and would weaken the European
Union such as it exists today by prohibiting any
progress on the CFSP or by reducing it to those
aspects of a cornnron foreign policy that are
directly related to the economy.
94. One of the important effects of including
security and defence in the European Union's
activities should be to prompt the Union to be
more rigorous than it has been in the past about
admitting new members. It should require any
applicant country to take the steps necessary for it
to participate unreservedly in the eftbrt to set up
and implement a common foreign and security
policy which would not automatically exclude the
use of force, and to show a willingness to join
NATO and WEU.
95. Furthermore, the priority assigned to defence
implies that WEU would not be subordinate to the
CFSP. This does not mean WEU should not make
preparations to respond to a request from the
Union but that the WEU Council must preserve its
autonomy not only for the purpose of taking deci-
sions in order to in-rplement requests emanating
from the CFSP but also of defining a common
foreign, security or defence policy of the member
countries without necessarily waiting for an
agreement to be reached by all fifteen. The idea
here is that lnilitary action should not have to
depend on the agreement of countries not partici-
pating in a common defence, and that Europe
should continue to be an acceptable partner for all
the members of the Atlantic Alliance. including
the United States, in areas covered by NATO
activi ties and responsibilities.
96. The path leading to the necessary conver-
gence of the policies of member countries of
WEU and the European Union therefore lies in
communication between the two organisations.
the only limits being those imposed by WEU's
ties with NATO. The participation of a WEU
representative in CFSP meetings would appear to
be the simplest way of ensuring such communica-
tion if the option of giving the WEU Secretary-
General responsibility for the CFSP secretariat
had to be dismissed.
91 . Finally. as was quite clear to the authors of
the Maastricht Treaty. the prospect of a European
Union that included security and defence activi-
ties would certainly not condemn WEU to vege-
tate but should instead motivate it to develop its
activities both in the operational sphere proper
and in all the other areas in which it, and by exten-
sion Europe as a whole, should have the where-
withal to take action enabling it to conduct a more
autonomous policy: space observation, joint
armaments production, logistics facilities and
strategic lift capabilities would be the essential
elements alongside command capabilities. These
are areas in which WEU has already taken steps to
make pro-9ress. But it is doing so too slowly and,
in certain cases, without all its members taking
part in the endeavour, whrch makes it difficult at a
later stage for WEU to exploit facilities that
belong to certain members only. It is clearly not
possible to torce member countries into new com-
mitments but it is up to the Assembly to stress that
WEU will not derive any real benefit from the ini-
tiatives taken in certain quarters unless everybody
is involved in them.
98. In contrast, WEU has no reason to lay
claim to responsibilities that can be or in fact are
exercised by the European Union, i.e. those that
do not imply the use of armed forces. European
security also includes the provision of administra-
tive assistance to countries in difficulty 
- 
such as
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
- 
the distribution of huntani-
tarian aid in regions where it is required. the light
against Mafia dealings and against drug traffic.
The European Union is tnore ablc than WEU to
take up these challenges and any action it takes
does not invalidate the defence options of its
members. WEU can therefore confine itself to
organising the military assistance any of the
Union's initiatil'es require. as is the case in
Mostar.
99. The third objective, the organisation of a
European security system, is not the direct res-
ponsibility o1'NATO, WEU or the European
Union but of all the European countries. including
Russia. The role of the western organisations in
this respect is to support those that are best suited
to give European security a legal framework but
have no efl'ective means of taking action. This is
curently the case of the OSCE and indeed of the
Council of Europe. Nevertheless. as a result of
their achievements over the last fifiy years in
setting up a western security system, NATO, the
European Union and WEU have credit throughout
Europe. This allows them to build up the trust that
is essential for enlarging the systern which many
see as a model and think could be considerably
extended. The Europe agreements concluded by
nine Central European countries which have
declared their intention to join the European
Union. are an important gauge of the positions
they will adopt in the future. As WEU associate
partners, these countries can take part in the plan-
ning and, possibly. the execution of measures
designed to keep or restore peace and this is what
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solne of them did in the Yugoslav crisis. The pur-
pose of the Partnership fbr Peace is to shou' that
NATO has no aggressive intentions. It aints only
to strengthen peace and rehabilitate trust in Euro-
pe and not to enlarge the Washington Treaty, and
NATO.
100. The issue of some of these countrics
moving on to full rnembership of one or other
organisation clearly, poses a problern and leaves
westenr countries in somewhat of a dilemma in
view of Russia's sensitivity about this matter and
the difficulty of enlarging NATO to absorb all
nine countries ilt once. Yet if some of them were
admitted promptl)' and the applications of others
defened. the problcnt of the rejected group's reac-
tions u'ould also arise. While this complex issue
does not fonl part of the preparations for the
intergovernmental conf'erence. it does confirm the
need fbr measures on thc CEEC taken by,NATO,
the European Uniou and WEU to be coordinated
in order not to accentuate the differences separa-
ting those states and as a rcsult contpromise the
desired process of convergence.
l0l. The priorities this report sets lbr the objec-
tives described imply that those in secoud and
third place should be pursued rvith the grcatest
caution and, above all else. in perntanent and
detailed consultation with the United States. It is
vital that any action protnoting either the esta-
blishment of closer links betu,een the European
Union and WEU or the creation of a European
systcm should not result in a crisis in transatlantic
relations, both because Europe would cease to
have a satisfactorv defence and because it would
be inrpossiblc to achieve the second and third
objectives il'the first was not attained. It is ditfi-
cult lbr the Unitc'd States to refuse the principle of
a European del'ence identity, r'egardless of its
framework. but establishing such an identity
implies a change in a certain type of relationship
rvhich can only be brought about w'ith the agree-
ment of all the partners and thrttugh a verv
gradual process.
102. Lastly. none of these objcctrves can be
achieved unless the European countries. uhich
alone have the llnancial resources. control oftheir
armed forces and power of decision that are indis-
pensable for any action in the field of defence, put
an end to the decline in their military activitic-s.
Although justified by changes in the international
situation since 1989. in manl'countries this dec-
liue has gone so far that their participation in a
cornrnon defence is gradually losing credibi-
lity. The prospect of a European defence must not
be used as an excuse for not meeting national
def'encc requirernents. Instead it should enhance
the eflbrts that have been utade to put each state in
a better positiou to achieve its own objectives by
integratine them in a Europeau system. Wherever
there is an absencc of resolve on the part of
nations and their populations, institutrons 
- 
hou,ever
excellent they may be 
- 
will never be able to com-
pensate tbr it in the search for convergence. in
defence policy. in the developrnent of the CFSP,
in the organisation of a European security systel.r-r
or in the establishment of a European identity.
This is probably the most serious threat to the
intergovernmental conference in so far as secLrrity
and def'ence are concerned. It ts not a question of
coming up with fonnulas that will produce sonte
vaguc consensus amon-s all the parlicipants. What
is important is to secure under-takings on realistic
objectives and prograntmes that bind the coun-
tries lo :elious cornmitmcnts.
103. It is with this in rnind that your Rapporteur
u,ould wish WEU to l'enew its endeavours to pro-
duce a u hite paper on European security and
defence bringing up to. date_points,on which there
is conl'er_eence, pinning down those on which
convergence cannot be achievcd at the present
time and drawing the consequences in terms of
budgets. manpower, equipnrent and strategy,. rvith
the aim of making each state f ully aware of its res-
ponsibilities. This exercise should be rcpeated
regularly to show that European def-cnce is in the
rnaking and that WEU's contribution to thc Euro-
pean Union is becoming a reality, even though the
lwo organ isations remain separate.
VlL Conclusiotts
l0+. Your Rapporteur considers that all the poli-
tical authoritics that have taken on the task of pre-
paring thc intergovernmental conf-erence and guid-
ing it to produce tangible results must stop
makin_e public opinittn believe that, at the con-
ference. Europe will be l'aced with the choice of
pro_qress or disintegration 
- 
the inevitable conse-
quence of which would be a retum to former
rir,'alries and to the policy of a balance of porvers
and allies litting the cilcrrrrrstat)ccs.
105. The 1996 conference will certainlv not be
the last of its kincl to deal with the problems of
building Europe and it is definitely, not " rhe lasr
chance" conference! Since the 1950s the process
of econornic and political inte-qration has been
ntoving forward laboriouslr,. It has sontetirnes
gone through periods of stagnation and has sonre-
titnes been given neu,' impetus. Those r.l'ho want
to make a qualitative leap foru,ard towards a
genuine comnton polic1, in areas that are at the
core of national soverei_enty 
- 
such as fbreign,
security and defence policy and defence itself 
-
would do rr,,ell to remember that the political will
necessary for such a leap is not produced to order
as a result of rnstitutional an-angements but is the
fiuit of hard labour that entails identifying national
interests and ntaking thent converge. Everyone
acknowledges that fundamental decisions on
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security and def'ence tnust ret.nain the respons-
ibility of statcs.
106. The opponents of an1, institutional ittl.egra-
tion betw'een WEU and the European Union need
to be lerninded that integrating WEU with the
CFSP would not prevent lnember states from
taking decisions that fall u ithin the realnr of their
national sovereignty. Howet,er. integration o1' that
type- would do nothing to facilitate the decision-
making process, as has been shown in this report.
In order to nrake real progress. the first thin-q to be
done is to stren,uthen the way in which the CFSP
works and. perhaps even tnore itnportantly. give
WEU the political irnpetus it needs in order to act.
either in response to a CFSP reqltest or on the
basis of its own policy decisions.
101 . In this respect the principles set lbrth in the
Joint Declaration by Italy and the United King-
dom on WEU in the context o1'European security
and det'ence. of 6 December 1995 ''. should serve
as inspiration since the Declaration stresses inter
alia that in its development the European Union
should bc outward-looking and that it is " essen-
tial to give an impetus to WEU's role in elabora-
tin-e and inrpletnenting EU decisions and actions
u'hich har,e defence implications ". At the siune
time. WEU should be able to take policy cleci-
sions. if necessary. at the level of heads of state
and goverument.
108. Conversely, it is not appropnate to reduce
the rernit of WEU, as was the case ln the past. to
nrake it a simple " Ibruur tbr analysis and consul-
tation on the defence iurplications of secLtrity
issues of the CFSP " as described in paragraph 24
ol-the Madrid Declaration b1'the WEU Council of
Ministers l.
109. It is not by se-eking at all costs to give Euro-
pcan construction a single institutional framework
Documenr A/WELI/DG (95)-12. ll Decenrber 1995
Document l-19 I . 20 Nor ember I 9t)5
that some r.ner.nber governments will help to solvc
the problems that still put an obstacle in the rvay'
of a comnron policy. Without forgettin_e the need
for coherence, yet without fbr all that adr,'ocating
a " Europc a la calte ". your Rapporteur considers
that the approach should be a flexible one if
Europe is to arrive at thc greatest possible dcgrce
of integration in the various areas concerned.
110. Your Rapporteur believes that the model of
a " Europe with various patterns of inte-tration " is
rvorthl' of attention. In that rnodel, all the r.ner.nber
states u'ould have a.joint role in specific aleas of
action while in others they would be free to pro-
grcss lnore quickll' clr. on the contrary, to abstain
liom par-ticipation in an1' action or be only partly
involved ". This approach would allow WEU to
develop in a manner that would enable it at last
to ser-ve the European Uniou effectivell' and
cooperate wrth thc Atlantic Alliance.
ll1. Communitl' fundamentalisnr as it were has
had its day' and cver)'one nrust realise that the
methods uscd to engender and der'elop an ecouo-
mic Europe al'e not valid whcn it comes to foreign
and defencc policy. This was pert-ectly clear to the
si-enatories ol' the 19-54 Paris Agreements urodi-
f-ving thc Brussc-ls Treat1,. Any attempt to disown
reality, is bound to end in hclplcssness and uncer-
tainty. The ditficulties encountered in the ratif ica-
tion of the Maastricht Tleaty' highlighted the- dan-
ger. What is therefore nceded is a more cautious.
morc progressive apprclach but one u'hich is also
rnore positive and will lead to the constitution of a
European defence. The first stage is to reach
agreement on the ob;ectives pursued on the basis
o1'existing treaties. Omitting that stage in older to
construct an institutional edifice whosc facades
wor-rld doubtless bc attractive u ould be tanta-
nrount to building European defcncc on very
shaky' foundations.
13. Notc fiom the Belgr.rn Government ttr tltc parltament on
the 1996 intergorernn.tr'ntnl cont'erence. Iti October I99-5.
2l
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Associate members' view 
-
contributiort from Mr Godal, liorway
l. The following considerations are the pers-
onal views of the author and do not in any way
commit the Noru'egian government or parlianrent
or anyone else.
2. Associate members of WEU are. of course.
full menrbers of NATO and thus covered by
NATO's collective security guarantee. Correspon-
dingly they will irnmediately be fully involved if
any full member of WEU is attacked. Thus their
destinies as far as security is concerned are com-
pletely interu'o'n'en with that of the full members
of WEU.
-3. A common factor lbr two associate members,
Turkey and Norway. is their exposed geographic
position. Norway has a direct border with the
second nuclear superpower. Russia. which has a
high concentration of military lorces ou the Kola
peninsula. Turkey borders the unstable Soviet
Union successor states in the Caucasus. lceland is
also situated on what uscd to be called NATO's
northern flank. These geo_eraphic factors play an
irnportant role in the context of their security poli-
cy and their interest in taking part in the further
development of a European security and defence
identity throu_gh Western E,uropean Union of
which they hal'e become associate members.
1. The associate mernbers are all European
countries. It is in their interest to increase the sta-
bility of Europe. including the development of a
European capability' fbr handling security pro-
blems in cases where the North Arnerican mem-
bers of NATO do not wish to be involved. For this
reason the associate nrembers are very interested
in the further der,'e lopment of the European Union
and consequently in the outcome of the 1996
intergovernmental conf'erence especially, reeard-
ing the question of how securitv and defence
lnatters will be handled in future in the European
and transatlantic fiamework.
WEU ond NATO
5. Bccause of their gcographic position. the
preservation of transatlantic ties are of special
importance tor the associate r.nernbers. It is also
important to them that WEU truly becomes the
European pillar of NATO and that this pillar is
capable of acting efficientlv on its on,n u'hen
necessary. Rapid implementation of the combined
joint task fbrce (CJTF) concept is of special signi-
ficance in this respect. A development in which
Europe finds it necessary to duplicate the assets of
NATO is not only uneconomic but will inevitably
serve to weaken transatlantic ties. This is not in
the interest of Europe and especially not so fbr
the associate rnernbers of WEU. Rapid implemen-
tation o{' the CJTF concept is therefore of
paramount importance.
WEU and the European Union
6. While still considering NATO as the
bedrock of their security. the associate urembers
do not underestimate the importance, for their
own security. of the possibility of participating in
thc building of a European security and defence
identity. complernentary to NATO, in the liame-
work ol'Western European Union. Their wish to
becorne full members of WEU is based on the
understanding that the strict mutual assistance
clausc in Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty is irnportant fbr enhancing their security.
Thev are also ready to participate fully in Peters-
berg n-rissions on the basis of Article VIII.3 of the
Treat1,. Nou,' that they are associate members, the
possibility tbr their governments and parliamentar),
representatives to participate actively in the rvork
of all WEU institutions is highll, appreciated. It
gives them a saf in European secunty and def'ence
cooperation. evcn though they are not members of
the European Union.
l. One of the rnain subjects of the inter-
governmental conference is whether and to what
extcnt the European defence dimension. currently
thc responsibility ol' Western European Union,
could be pro_eressively integrated in the- European
Union rvithout affecting the Atlantic Alliance.
The associate mernbers are taking a special inter-
est in all the diff-erent options which werc elabor-
ated in the framework of the WEU Council and
led to the document adopted in Madrid on l-l
Novembcr 1995. on the " WEU contribution to
the European Union intergovernrnental con-
ference o1'1996 ".
8. For the time being it does not seem to be rn
the interest of the associate ntembers to integrate
WEU in the EU where not all nternbers are part of
the same collective security arrangernents. Secur-
ity and collcctive guarantees arc, of course.
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extremely serious matters which require absolu-
tely clear lines of responsibility, organisation and
decision-making. Such vital clarity would easily
be blurred if WEU were integrated in an organisa-
tion where some tnembers are not part of the col-
lective security arrangements and guarantees.
9. Whatever option is chosen as a result of the
conference. it is in the associatc tnet.trbers' strong
interest that any new arrangement does not dimin-
ish their possibility of participating fully in Euro-
pean security and defence activities. both on the
executive and the parliamentary side. They note
with interest the intention formulated in the above-
mentioned WEU document according to which, in
the case of full integration of WEU in the
European Union under option C, under which
the modif ied Brussels Treaty would disappear.
" the participation of associate members in the
further development of the European security and
def'ence identity (ESDI) would have to be main-
tained and even improved vis-d-vis their present
status, through appropriate arrangenlents to
ensure their involvement and association with the
CFSP'"
10. However, it is clearly in everybody's irtter-
est to simplify the present confusing nlosaic of
security organisations and memberships in
Europe. The ideal goal would be a situation u'here
all EU rnembers are also full members of the rele-
vant security structures.
11. If WEU gradually rnoves closer to the EU,
it is of vital importance for the associate metnbers
that this neither weakens the tlansatlantic ties. nor
reduces therr influence in the field of security. To
open up the possibility of full urernbership in
WEU for the associate met.nbers would be a
constructive step providing an assurance in this
respect. Since the1,are. as it is. fully integrated in
NATO's collective security guarantee, this should
not cause insurmountable problems.
Associate tnembers, associate partners
and observers
12. Bccause of their exposed geographic posi-
tions. any European conflict. if allowed to escal-
ate. may soon result in special pressure on, and
special danger for the associate members.
A stable Europe is therefore very important to
thern. Consequently it is in their interest that the
observers and associate partners in due course
become fully integrated in the relevant security'
structures, thereby strengthening European
cooperation. solidarity and stability.
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Associate partners' view 
-
contributiort from Mr Eiirsi, Htmgary
A. Rrsfrs and challenges to security irt Europe
G c tt c ru I c ort.s itle rut iort s
Security, is indivisible. It is conrprehensive
in character'. encompassing political, rnilitary, eco-
norlic and environrnental aspects as well as the
human dirncnsion. Derelopnrents of a very diff-er-
ent nature 
- 
political. nrilitary. human rights. eco-
nomic. social. environnrcntal all have the poten-
tial for puttin_t security at risk. In addition, all of
them are interconnected. A threat iu one dirnension
of security aff-ects the situation in other dontains.
Naturally. not every threat to security, is
present in every re_eion of Europe to thc- salle
extent. Different regions and sub-r'egions are
faced with different. sometinres ve11, specific
problems. At the same time. rhe indivisibility' ol'
security irnplies that all securitl, risks require the
full attention of each European state.
Since WEU concentrates its attention on
politico-militarv aspects of security. the focus
should be on this field.
P t t I i t i t't t - t tt i lilrU'r' r'r.rA.r I (, s (' ( t t ri t\'
Wcukrtcss rtr irrsufficit,ttt atlapkfiior? to new
conditions concelniug consultation mechanisms.
coordiuation, and thc rlutual completnentarity of
actions by states and existing European structures
and institutions. The lack of adequate resources
hinders the efforts to scttle legioual conf'licts.
Irtsu.l.licierrl tlevc lttprtrcnt ().f n(.r', ntore
dvrurnic pdttents oJ,securiN cttttpcru|iott.
Tlrc exrgget'afiou rf rtutiorrul lllt,rz.st.r jeo-
pardises efforts to create a new cooperative sy,steut.
Tlrc perltelueiiort o.t''u <'oltl wur trtctrtulitt'
results in distrust and confrontation. Elintinating
the heritage of decades of political. ideological
and military confrontation and building confid-
cnce take tirne and mutual etfort, and require a
nc\ approach to securitr issues.
Afiarrt\tts to (rcote :ones o.[ in.f'luenc.e.
Re-eror.rs iu cont'lict are rnuch more vulnerable to
the sphere-of'-influeuce polic1,.
Creutiort of rtcw tliyisiorts to replace oltl
di'i.sirut.y.
Arr urttluly c.tteudetl pt,riocl o.f'lronsition, as
u,ell as dela1, in the long-tcnl consolidation and
stabilisation of the result of transition. which mav
lead to a reversal of positil'e trends.
Prcporttleruttt'e o.f' lhe balurtce of Jorc.es
concept in se turity lxtlicv. The resulting notion of
providin-u total and erclusively military defence
against all real ttr intagined threats is not condu-
cive to scculill' cooperi.rlirln.
I r t <- re q s e tl i r t <' I i tutt i r t t t I o u s c 
.fb rc e i nt e n ut I l:'
atttl e.rterrtctlb lo st,ttlt, problctrts. Open wars and
military conflicts 
- 
like thc Balkan crisis.
Ethnic and nationalist-based territorial conflicts
with their spill-over potential and destabilising
effects on the whole system of security of Europe
are the most imrnediate threat to securitl,.
Cltrslt bcfireert tltc Ttrirtt'iplc o.f' tcrritoriul
irtlt,,qritt ctntl llrc rigltt to selJ-clatenrtirttrtittn. The
lack of a balance betu'een these tn'o principle s
and of a democratic political culture can lcad to
extrc-mities.
Uttrt,solyt,cl terrilorial tlisptttcs betweert
.\lutc.\ .
Irttt,rttul irt.stubilitie.s irt Europeun stote,\
nurl ul.so ltut'e tlurtgerous e.\tental implicutiorts.
Unstablc. non-dentocratic political structures
endan_9er the ability to solve problems peacefully.
The fra-qilit\,' ol'the rule of law, insufficient guar-
antees of human rights and fundamental free-
doms. insuffrcieut democratic control of armed
forces aud shortcontings in the limitation of
police powers are all detrirneutal to the develop-
ment of democratic stability.
Donteslit' tt,rtsiorts uttd irtterrtul politit.s
harin-s a negative influeucc on forei-rn policy,
decisions.
Clear uul gros.s t'iolutiotr.s o.l'bosi<' itttento-
tiorrul rtontrs and non-observance of intenrational
agreements undermine confidence between states.
Tlte tttttt-obsen'onc'e or t'i t't.utttt't,rtIitttt of
dnn.\ (ontt'ol obligcrticttts have a serious destabil-
ising eflect and erode confidence between states.
Risks persist in certain re_uions orving to deficien-
cies or a lack in arrns control in these areas.
Tltc pruli.fertffiort rf weopons LtJ'rrtuss des-
tntctittn can underntrne intemational peace and sta-
bility. Prolifcration is facilitated by uncontrolled
exports of arr.nal.nents, illicit dealings with nuclear
materials. illegal transt'ers of annaments and wea-
pons r.nanufacturing. techn<tlogy and knclw-how.
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An e.tcr'.r.ttt'e (tnn.\ builtl-u1t poses a threat
to sc-curity, particularly in regions o1'tension.
A dispxt1tttt'tiututt' t'ortcertruIiott oJ' urrtrcrl
.futrccs u'ithin certain regions trtay be viewed as
threatening, thus puttin-t international peacc and
security at risk. A changc in the balance of forces
can also have this effect.
Terrorisru is becorning a ntol'e widespread
menace to societ1,. challen-eing the preservation of
security, dernocracy and human ri-ehts.
B. A Central European perspective
I. Central Europe is not directlv threatened
militarily and lepresents ntl threat ttl other
re-tions. No Central European country threatens
any other. Central Europe is stable but because of
the huge number of politico-militarv risks. its sta-
bility, in the futr.rre is difficult to evalttate.
Stable resions in Europe are expected to
project stabilitf into Central Europe by a combi-
nation of ect'rttomic assistance and cooperatiotl.
as well as by expanding westet'n institutions. so
that the results of transition are further consoli-
dated.
It was only in the eastern half of Ettrope
that institutional chan-ues pt'operlv retlected the
historical changes of 1989-90. The adaptatiotr of
western European institutions did not keep pace
with thesc changes. The " freeze " on membership
of those structures cl'eates a sensc of insecurity in
Central Europe.
The prospects of early accession by Central
European states to westerlt institutions itcts as al.l
ir-nportant " political magnet ". consolidating the
results of transitiou in these countries and stimu-
lating further progress. Continuing delays in
taking l'irm decisions in fhl'our of the accession of
those who have ntet the requiretnents will quickly
erode the stabilising efl-ect as well as the credibi-
lity, o1'the organisatious concerned. Should they
prol'e unable to adapt to a draruatically changed
European security ent'ironment. thcir future rtlle
nrrry he calletl into question.
From this perception stems the tear thtt old
sc-curity blocs rnight be replaced by new econo-
mic divisions. Freezirtg access to such institu-
tions and organisatiotrs threatetrs to bring back
cold war divisions in new forms.
II. Horvever. mere enlargenteltt of the institu-
tions themselves is insufficient to solve the long-
term security concertrs of the wider Euro-Atlantic
region. The different parts of this region probabll'
cannot 
- 
aud certainly should not 
- 
be isolated
h'om one another. It is obvious that instability or
unprcdictability in any part of the rcgiott has
serious security intplications in the other parts as
well. Accordingly. instability or unpredictability
rn Central Europe jeopardise the security of Wes-
tern Europe and the u,hole Euro-Atlarttic re-tion.
Cousequently, it is in the- conrmon interest to esta-
blish and rnaintain an efl-ective pan-European, or
rather, transatlantic security architecture. In ordcr
to achieve this goal. tl-rere is no need for new
institutions. The existing structures have already
proved reliable and rc'present continLtity. They
should. however. be:
- 
irnproved in order to cope w'ith new chal-
lenges;
- 
linked closcly to and harntonised with
one another:
- 
enhanced through certain ne\\' arrange-
r.nents (but certainly not tlore institu-
tions).
The basic principles to be taken into consi-
deration with respect to the neu' security' architec-
ture are as follows:
( u ) The irulivisibi litt' of securitt'
No region in Europe can be saf'e and secure
u,ithout the others enjoying security and stability'.
This does not unconditionally meatt equal sccur-
ity. but rathcr a definitivc tendency towards it.
(b) Tlrc conrple.r' urttl contprelrcttsive trulure
of securih'
A nrilitary balance at the lowest possible
level of anraments and manporver solely' fbr self-
defence is still inrportant but prerentir,e policv
should play a more substantive role and more
attention should be paid to other componcnts of
security. such as the political, econonric, social,
individual and minority rights components. Orga-
nic links between rnilitary attd democratic institu-
tions and civilian control of the military dimen-
sion is also an essential tool for preventive
security policy.
(c) Tlrc ctxtpcrutit't' clrurac'ter of ,securil'
The l'artous structures should be intellock-
ing (but not inlerblocking) in their spheres of acti-
l'ity'. There should not bc subordination or priolitl'
aurong them. nor should there be any kind of cotn-
petition inrolving unltecessary' conflict. The
irnportance of rnaking the most of the compalati-
ve advantages of diff'erent security or-ganisrttions
cannot be ovet'estintated.
For example. OSCE. being the most trans-
atlantic orgatrisation and cove-rin-u an area stretch-
ing fronr Vancouver to Vladilostok, is ercellent
for multilateral exchanges of views but often
lacks substantial inflLrence. NATO covers a stnal-
ler area but is the sole instrtution that possesses a
clediblc military potential to ttnplement security
decisions. The European Union can contribute
substantially to economic and social stability and
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to political security, as a rule by operating through
WEU for most of its mernbers and in specific
cases on its own. Where WEU is concerned. the
idea of strengthening its tunction as the European
pillar of NATO and the def-ence component of the
EU serves Europe's special security interests.
Finally. the Council of Europe has the most exper-
ience with regard to individual and rninority
rights. these being essential factors of stability.
IIL There are theoretically five basic pillars
upon which the new European securitl' architec-
ture should be built:
First pillar: Enlar_eement of NATO. the
European Union, Western European Union and the
Council of Europe. Should any of these institutions
decide not to enlar-ee. Central Europe will rernain
in a security, \'acuunt and stability could not be
nraintained either in Central Europe or, as a conse-
quence, in Europe as a whole. On the other hand,
while stability rnust be projected to as many Cen-
tral European countries as possible, enlargement
can and should apply to eligible and qualific-d
countries only, in order not to endanser the ef}'ecti-
veness and standards of the relevant institutions.
Second pillar: the OSCE, whrch is unique
in setting norms and which has a broad network of
mechanisms and ortans. In other words. it oper-
ates a comprehensive system of preventive diplo-
macy. similarly to the OfTice for Democratic Ins-
titutions or High Cornmissioners. After years of
some doubt, the OSCE was successful in getting
conflictrng parties around the negotiating table in
summer 199-5 in Grozny and will play a signifi-
cant role in the establishment of democratrc insti-
tutions and in the organisatron of elections in
Bosnia. Since it is the ntost comprehensive trans-
atlantic organisation. improved cooperation bet-
ween the OSCE and the United Nations is a very
important and f'ar-reaching goal.
Third pillar: Special affangements. enhanced
dialogue and cooperation betw'een the structures of
the first pillar and those countries that are not
members of the same. either because they do not
intend to join or because they are not yer eligible to
do so. The NATO Parlnership fbr Peace programnte
should be brought to a higher level, in order to
maintain cooperation on a pan-European scale and
to endorse the comntitment of applicant countries
that are not yet eligible for membership. lt is crucial
that all Central European countries should f-eel the
door is open. There will be no new dividing line
replacing old dil'isions and European structures
should prol'ide help to meet the requirements fbr full
membership. WEU can play an essential role in this
process by' increasing cooperation with its associate
members and enhancing the status they were granted
in the Kirchbers Decliil'ation of 9 May 1994.
Special attention is to be paid to Russia in
the third pillar as it is one of the most sensitive
issues for European security and also has a huge
military potential. Russia opposes NATO enlarge-
ment and there is a fear that NATO enlarsement
would radicalise Russian policy. It has beei stres-
sed on nrany occasions that Russia has no veto on
NATO enlargement. It is obvious that Russia has
no veto in the legal sense of the word but Russian
opposition already constitutes a de facto r,,eto. The
dilernrna is huge since one of the key colnponents
of long-term European security is a dernocratic
Russia. It should be noted, however, that a de facto
veto can also radicalise Russia hecause it cndorses
its view that it has a right to extend its influence as
a tormer r.lorld power. Enlargement is an iutpor-
tant step not just in order to fill the security
vacuum in Central Europe, but also to moderate
any undesirable Russiau ambitions. On the other
hand. all possible means should be used to rnake
Russia f-eel sal-e. Consequently, it should be off'ered
a special arrangement with a view to meetine its
concerns, except as regards enlargement itself.
Fourth pillar: Regional and sub-regional
cooperation in Central Europe, sintilar to that
already existing within European structures. The
CEFTA. Central European Initiative. Alps-Adria-
tic Working Group and Carpathian Euro-Region
are 
-rood examples. which need to be enhanced.
These structures do not reprL-sent alternatives to
full integration in European structures, but provi-
de tools for contrnunication and harmonise inter-
ests, thus providin_e more stability and Euro-
conformity fbr participating countries.
Fifth pillar: Network o1'bilateral trearies
between neighbourin-q states in Central Europe.
These treaties are especially intportant between
countries that have Ibught each other in history.
They make a substantial contribution to European
stability by confirming the inviolability of exis-
ting borders and suaranteeing the respect of mino-
ritv rights. The European Stability Pact provides
an ercellent tramework fbr bilateral arrangements
and European organisations should increase their
comuritment to influence the process and monitor
the application of the treaties concluded.
IV. When dcciding on the expansion of western
institutions, long-tenn European security interests
should take priority over short-sighted percep-
tions of national interests.
The projection of stability fiom the West
should be seen as a broad. comprehensive process.
encompassing areas beyond the politico-rnilitary
and benefiting every country in the long term.
There are no losers in this process. which should
lead to a rnore dernocratic and inclusive security
order built on shared European democratic values.
Timely accession to NATO, WEU and
the EU by those countries thar are readl,for it would
contribute tremendously, to the eastward projection
ol stability which is in er,,erybody's interest.
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APPENDIX III
Observers'view 
-
contributiort from Mr Paasio, Finland
l. The following viewpoints represent the co-
Rapporteur's personal opinions and do not neces-
sarily reflect official positions of the Finnish
Govemment.
2. The political and security climate of Europe
is still undergoing rapid change. Although the
cold-war years are over. this is not necessarily
reflected in the development of corresponding
security doctrines. The language used in the Euro-
pean debate ou security is still. at least to solne
cxtent. based on the models o1' two antagonistic
camps. Hrstorically this is not surprising as the
legacy of cold rvar is not easy to live with. This
means. however, that the security challengcs of a
new el'a arc not uret in sutficient degree and that
the necessary instruments for modern crisis
management have not been adequately developed.
3. It is possible. if not obvious, that the same
historical 
-qap in political culture also characte-
rises the positions of those European countries
that have adopted a polic1' of military non-align-
ment. The prolound change in the role of NATO
when compared to the cold-war years has perhaps
not been fully understood. The same is no doubt
true as far as the military organisations them-
selves are concerned.
-1. It is of utmost importance that European
security developments do not lead to renewed
bipolarity between East and West. This basic prin-
ciple calls for enhanced cooperation and openness
as well as mutual respect between all the actors in
the great European drar.na.
P o I i ct' rf' ut- t iv e r utrt - u I i grtrtr utt
5. Different EU member countries have
adopted diff'erent security policies. The majority
of thern are members ol- NATO and three
countries have chosen a policy of non-alignment.
This is a fact that is bound to alfect common
security structures in Europe.
6. The non-aligned EU members have chosen
observer status in WEU. This does not indicate
any desire to be passive. The pragmatic working
methods of WEU enable even observers to actively
participate in designing new security architectut'e
for Europe.
1 . The active role of neutral and non-aligned
countries in the CSCE process, especially in the
1970s and 1980s contributed significantly to the
creation of detente. Bridging the gaps between the
superpowers and military alliances was possible
because an atmosphere of confidence could gra-
dually be achieved.
8. During the cold-war years, it was relatively
easy to define the concept of neutrality. Today it is
much more complicated. The absence of rival
military alliances and ideologies makes it difficult
to understand what neutrality is. This explains
why Finland does not use the word " neutrality "
in official security documents any more. Termino-
logically speakin-e. " non-alignment " is rnore
prccisc and easy to understand.
9. Historically', the policies o1'neutrality and
non-alignment are not identical rn all the countries
concerned. [n sorne countries long historical tradi-
tion constitutes the nrain background for their
security doctrines. u'hile rn others the legacy of
World War II is clearly visible.
Case stuth 
- 
Firtlartd
10. In spite of its relatively eastern geographi-
cal location. Finland rs a typical West European
country as far as historical ties, culture. national
economy and political democracy are concerned.
These characteristics made it possible for the
nation to maintain its identity and develop ele-
ments of independence during the decades of
oppression under tsarist Russia. Finland was
declaled independent in 1917. Notwithstanding
rts non-independent status as a grand duchy under
the Russian tsar, Finland already had a modern
single-chaurber parlianrent based on universal
suffrage for both men and women as early as
I 906.
I L Joining the European Union consolidated
Finland's rnembership with in the family of Wes-
tern European nations. It is obvious that national
security elernents \\'ere ln the minds of the Finns
when l'oting in the referendum. The positive out-
come reflected the prognosis. This means that
security concepts are not interpreted in a rnilitary
context alone.
12. The 1 300 km long border between Finland
and Russia also became a border between Russia
and the EU when Finland joined the Union. From
the security point of view, this fact emphasises the
extrelne inrportance of a situation of low political
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and militar-v tcnsion in the northcrn part ol
Europe.
13. The key' question is who is to maintain the
peaceful atrnosphere in the North and by what
rureans'.) What kind ol'factors would disturb it'l
The Parliarrent of Finland has debated and adop-
ted a special report w'ith the title " Security in a
chan_ging world ". The Parlianrent and the
Government of Finland unanimously stated that
the policy of non-alignment still serves the security
interests ol'Finland and the whole region. It is
obvious that anv rapid change in this unanirnously
adopted securitv doctrine would cause tc-nsion
to rise betll,ecn Finland and Russia and thus
betr.leen Russia and the EU.
11. Finland u'rll actively participate in the dia-
logue and cooperation on enhancin,q security in
Europe as a cortrrnitted meutber of the Europcan
Union and u'i1l also discuss these matters with
or-eauisations snch as NATO and WEU.
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